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Abstract
Pervasive computing envisions an environment in which we are surrounded by
many embedded computer devices. The existence of those networked devices
provides us with a mobile, spontaneous and dynamic way to access various
resources provided by different (security policy) domains. In recent years, we
have witnessed the evolutionary development of numerous multiple domain
applications. One of the richest examples is pervasive environments. Typi-
cally, the conventional approach to secure access over multiple domains is to
implement a unique trusted infrastructure, extending local identity or capa-
bility based security systems and combining them with cross-domain authen-
tication mechanisms. However, this does not adequately meet the security
requirements of communicating with unknown players in pervasive environ-
ments. Moreover, it is infeasible to define a global trust infrastructure and a
set of assumptions that every player will trust in the multiple domain context.
A powerful design technique to address those new security challenges posed
by pervasive environments is to understand them from a domain perspective.
This thesis presents Localisation of Trust (LoT), an architectural frame-
work designed to address the security need of how to talk to correct strangers
in pervasive environments. Based on the localising trust security principle,
LoT provides a generic platform for building access control over multiple do-
mains from two ends: authentication and authorisation. Firstly, LoT proposes
a two-channel authentication protocol to replace traditional (strong) identity-
based authentication protocols by exploring desirable contextual information
for different pervasive applications. Then, delegation and localised authenti-
cation are deployed to achieve authorisation in pervasive environments. The
heart of this different semantic is to let the right domain get involved with its
local players’ interactions by helping them to convert a “token” to a usable
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access capability, whilst keeping revocation in mind. This is done by introduc-
ing a domain-oriented Encryption-Based Access Control method, using ideas
borrowed for Identity-based Encryption.
The second part of this thesis describes several specific mechanisms and
protocols including a Dual Capabilities Model to achieve the required anti-
properties for LoT. Although novel, they are intended primarily as an existence
proof rather than being claimed to be ideal. Depending upon the precise
application and context, other mechanisms may be better. Most importantly,
the architecture-focused LoT provides such a flexibility by introducing multiple
domains as a primary concern but leaving untouched the security protocols
underlying each single domain and system implementation. Finally, a single
domain scenario, guest access, is examined with the light of LoT. The purpose
of doing so is to enhance the understanding of domain and other concepts
described in LoT and demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of LoT for
the scenarios chosen.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
As computing resources become increasingly pervasive, human users discover
that they can access more and more resources spontaneously and dynamically.
These resources in pervasive environments are usually provided by a variety of
different suppliers, for instance, organisations, companies, universities, shops,
even other human users, and so on. While much past research on security
protocols for distributed systems has addressed the issues arising in conven-
tional networking environments, today’s spontaneous and highly decentralised
pervasive environments applications have raised a number of new challenges
in a considerably underexplored territory, security over multiple domains.
A number of security systems have been developed previously to apply
traditional, well-studied schemes, including secret key exchange, public key
certificates, access control lists and capabilities, etc., to satisfy the security
needs of conventional environments (e.g. distributed systems). However, I am
not aware of much work that attempts to clarify and focus on the security
concern over multiple domains as the primary setting. In fact, most existing
works target the security problems in a single domain first, then lift a security
system (that is being successfully implemented in a single domain) to the mul-
tiple domain context. Usually, this is done by the implementation of a unique
trusted infrastructure, extending (local) identity or capability based security
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systems and combining them with cryptographic (cross-domain) authentica-
tion mechanisms. However, this approach will be cumbersome in pervasive
environments due to the spontaneous and dynamic nature of pervasive inter-
actions. More significantly, this is not what we really want. There is typically
a lack of a global trust infrastructure which every player will trust. More-
over, it is infeasible to force each domain to implement the same (or even
compatible) security infrastructure and mechanisms.
As a result, this dissertation presents my research on security over multi-
ple domains, particularly the pervasive computing environment. I argue that
security for the pervasive environment can only be partially solved, if security
for multiple domains cannot be solved first. Based upon some current state-
of-the-art of research works in the security filed, I am proposing a new security
framework, called LoT (Localisation of Trust). LoT presents a conceptually
simple idea 1 in spite of the considerably tricky protocol implementation. It is
not a system implementation, as most underlying mechanisms adopted in LoT
are not (purely) new. However, we intend to change the way of conventional
thinking on security, particularly for pervasive environments. Consequently,
in essence, LoT is an architectural security framework.
This chapter describes the motivation and outlines the contributions of
this work. It begins with a brief discussion of single and multiple domains.
This is followed by some definitions in section 1.2. Section 1.3 examines new
challenges posed by multiple-domain oriented pervasive environments. Section
1.4 illustrates the approach that is adopted in this dissertation to guide the
development of LoT. Section 1.5 outlines the contribution of this research.
This chapter ends with the description of the structure of the rest of this
dissertation.
1Although I have to admit that it took me three versions of draft to describe it simply.
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1.1 Single Domain vs. Multiple Domains
The concept of domain is not entirely new in the security field, but may be used
differently in different contexts. In conventional environments (e.g. distributed
systems), administrative domains have been used to organise resources into
domains. Often, the conventional administrative domains are based upon the
geographic location (i.e. in the same machine, in the same building, attached
to the same network) of resources for the purpose of easy administration and
security.
Conversely, the concept of domain used in this dissertation is not based
upon physical geography. Instead, it implicitly means a security (policy) do-
main which may span over several administrative domain boundaries (or ge-
ographic locations). As a consequence, if the same security policies apply to
numerous (conventional) domains, those (conventional) domains are actually
in a single domain. For example, two (administrative) domains (i.e. com-
pany A in London and company B in Cambridge) decide to implement the
classic Kerberos [122] system and both reply upon one particular Kerberos
server KSe. From the security policy administration perspective, it is not sur-
prising that both (administrative) domains are actually in the same (security)
domain under domain server KSe.
Thus, the term multiple domains will be used when resources are subject
to different security policies, even though some of them may be residing in the
same geographic location. The richest case of the multiple domain context
is pervasive environments, when many players from different domains wish to
interact with each other spontaneously and more openly. A concrete definition
of the term domain will be given in the following section.
To access resources in a single domain, local players need to contact the
domain servers, such as use of a pre-defined userID and password to log in,
a shared key proof or a certificate. Those local players can be physically
13
located either within the geographical boundary of conventional domain, or
outside the geographical boundary. Some attempts have been made to address
the security issues in the later case recently, as witness mobile computing
applications wishing to access resources over an unreliable link. From our
viewpoint, this is not the big problem. Instead, the most central issue here
is, how to access resources in other domains. This is much more difficult
than to access resources in a user’s own domain, because one player from
a domain A has to struggle to understand another domain B’s policy or its
own players’ roles. Hence, if an interaction involves a number of domains, it is
hard to convince communicating players whether they are communicating with
correct players (coming from different domains), or with an insider attacker
who is equipped with local knowledge of remote domains. In other words,
communicating players (e.g. human users, devices) from different domains,
cannot easily trust each other.
1.2 Definition
Before discussing the issues further, some definitions that will be frequently
used in this dissertation are given in this section, as some of these terms may
be defined differently in other works.
Domain : unless a specific indication is given, by the term domain in this dis-
sertation, we denote the scope of security policy rather than geographic
location. It acts like a security domain.
Local/Localisation/Localised : by “local/localised/localisation” to a user,
we mean being part of the user’s domain, not geographic locality. For
instance, a client Alice and the bank have different local domains.
Strangers : the definition of strangers is based upon the understanding of
domain. Compared with a localised user, communicating principals (e.g.
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human users, devices) will be considered as “strangers” from a user Al-
ice’s perspective, if they are not known before and have not established
any prior security relationship (with Alice). Most likely, in this disserta-
tion, strangers are usually from different domains to Alice. In this case,
strangers’ domains are described as remote or foreign domains for Alice.
Multiple domains and pervasive environments : the term multiple do-
mains and pervasive environments are used interchangeably in this dis-
sertation. It includes (but is not limited to) any pervasive computing
applications that genuinely involve many different domains.
Confinement : in the multiple domain context, this term describes the prob-
lem of confining an attack from a domain within that domain (the anal-
ogy is similar to the confinement problem discussed in Lampson’s paper
[76]), particularly for the interactions between two distrusted users. Usu-
ally, when an insider attack occurs, confinement is needed to ensure that
damage in one domain will not result in the damage in other domains.
1.3 New Challenges
With the rapid development of pervasive computing [104, 108, 128, 129], mul-
tiple domain applications are increasingly commonplace. Some of their ma-
jor characteristics which challenge the conventional security paradigm are de-
scribed below:
• Cross boundaries: in pervasive environments, an individual (security)
domain often spans several organisational or geographical boundaries.
It is important that the proposed security framework can support cross
boundary management.
• Open surroundings and spontaneous interaction: pervasive users are go-
ing to interact with resources, or with each other, whenever and wherever
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they would like to. Such a highly spontaneous nature brings openness
to most pervasive interactions, for instance, access an on-line shop in a
public cafe, or a peer-to-peer mobile ad-hoc file transfer. This requires
the proposed security framework to deal with some previously unknown
devices or human users, i.e. strangers.
• Transient associations: the associations among pervasive users are nor-
mally only for a (really) short period of time. For instance, Bob uses
his PDA to withdraw cash from a ATM in a street that he has not
been in before. The secure association between his PDA and this ATM
will be terminating as soon as the completion of this cash withdrawal.
Thus, the proposed security framework should be sufficiently flexible to
support transient (cross domain) associations.
• High levels of decentralisation and heterogeneity: different domains have
different assumptions, and implement different security systems. It is
infeasible to place a globally unique infrastructure in practice. To do so
essentially forces every domain to use the infrastructure’s assumptions.
The proposed security framework must give every domain the freedom
to choose the detailed security implementation (for their own domain)
according to their own security policy.
Above all, we can see that our target computing environment will be large-
scale, highly decentralised, pervasive and more importantly span multiple do-
main boundaries. As a result, the security problems will become more complex
and be infeasible to be addressed in a single step. A swiss army knife 2 secu-
rity approach which takes protocols developed for the single domain case as
attempts to apply them to the pervasive environment will be unlikely to suc-
cessfully address the different threats imposed by different domains or different
2In paper [92], Needham pointed out that a swiss army knife protocol may not always
be a good approach for security.
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applications.
When interactions involve two untrusted users (or strangers) from differ-
ent domains, an old paradigm to address this problem is to create a trusted
environment by employing a global unique trusted infrastructure. A typical
example is many Trusted Third Parties (TTP) based approaches, such as Pub-
lic Key Infrastructures (PKIs). They let the infrastructure pre-define a set of
assumptions that a trusted environment should meet. Thus, a security system
or protocol implemented successfully in one domain can be migrated to differ-
ent domains involved in the communications, combining with both important
and necessary cross-domain authentication mechanisms. Explicitly, this is
to invite and recruit many different domains into a big single domain. In a
conventional network environment, the security resources and policy are stat-
ically configured within domain boundaries, no matter whether the network is
inter-connected in a wired or wireless way. Thus, such a security understand-
ing (“big single domain”) has arguably addressed the security concern when
many different domains are involved.
However, this is not a good idea even if we could do it. To have global trust
is actually distracting us from what is more important in our own domains.
In the multiple domain context, information and resources are provided by
different organisations and other human users, even in a single physical en-
vironment. Interacting players from different domains are not likely to know
each other, or have communicated before. It is not only infeasible to create
a trusted environment to which those players can connect; more importantly,
it is not what we want. We do not want the infrastructure to deter us from
our own local policy, as far as security over multiple domains is concerned.
Thus, a guarantee from a TTP may compromise security, and cross-domain
authentication is not something that we should build on top of.
17
1.4 My Approach
In contrast, I would like to focus upon security over multiple domains as a
starting point. I argue that security in a single domain is best seen as a
special case of security over multiple domains. The richest case of security
over multiple domains is the revolutionary pervasive computing environment.
In pervasive environments, we are going to talk to stranger 3 users/domains
frequently in a dynamic and spontaneous manner.
An interesting threat which emerges now is, how to talk to the correct
stranger, particularly without the presence of a global fixed long-term trust
infrastructure. I am motivated by the problem of talking to correct strangers
in the context of pervasive environments from the beginning of this research.
Explicitly, I would like to design a security countermeasure that is independent
of any global universal trust infrastructures. More significantly, the approach
has to be extremely efficient and easily implemented, considering heteroge-
neous single domains in the multiple domain context.
Thus, I introduce an important concept of localising trust design princi-
ple in security policy, which encourages domains (precisely, domain servers or
administrative authorities) to get involved with their local users’ communica-
tion. In essence, the Localisation of Trust (or LoT) security framework is the
result of this principle. I consider security from the system architecture per-
spective, and system implementation is out of the scope of this dissertation.
Thus, LoT is an architectural framework rather than the implementation of
specific security systems. There are plenty of systems available in the market
which can be used to implement the architecture. More importantly, I argue
that the architectural issue is really important for the security in pervasive
environments.
3Recall section 1.2, users or domains are said to be strangers if a secure knowledge (e.g.
crypto-key information) or trust relationship has not been established previously among
them.
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The central part of the LoT framework is the novel dual capabilities model
(or DuCaM) and encryption-based access control method. Moreover, a new
form of certificate, Profile Certificate, is embedded into the dual capabilities.
Profile certificates are used only for conveying information between players
and their local domains, but not for making a final commit/abort decision for
players. Instead, the ultimate security (commit/abort) decision is controlled
by local domains, as inferred from the encryption-based access control. Even-
tually, a player in one domain can make a correct security decision without
the struggle of understanding the precise semantics of security mechanisms in
other domains.
1.5 Contribution
The primary contribution of this thesis is the design of a novel, localisable
security framework, Localisation of Trust, or LoT, for multiple domains. LoT
is designed to address many of the emerging research issues described previ-
ously. The essential concern is to convince readers that the LoT framework is
an efficient and effective approach, when talking to correct strangers (under
different assumptions) is desired.
Briefly, as a matter of principle, each domain in the LoT framework is
encouraged to deal with their own security explicitly, rather than messing
around with that of other domains. Conventionally, most security systems
heavily rely upon foreign authorities’ final commit/abort decision-making even
when this was designed for a completely different purpose. In contrast to
those systems, in the LoT framework the security decision-making for each
particular transaction is ultimately controlled locally. A significant benefit
of doing this is that users will not need to understand precise semantics of
security mechanisms in other domains.
The key contributions are described below together with the chapters where
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the relevant work can be found.
• Identifying the incorrect strangers problem in the multiple domain con-
text, and proposing a design principle in security policy that guides the
design of security countermeasures. A principle called localising the trust
is presented, with the intention to serve as a general foundation for the
design of future security systems, including (but not limited to) LoT.
(Chapter 3)
• Designing a generalised model and basic infrastructure for the LoT frame-
work. Another important part of this work is to design a tool-kit like set
of security mechanisms, examining LoT from both authentication and
access control ends. (Chapter 3)
• Proposing the concept of taking advantage of the positive human con-
text to solve security issues in pervasive environments, and developing
a human-centred authentication scheme with 2-channel approach to re-
place conventional (strong) ID-based authentication. (Chapter 4)
• Designing a new form of certificate, profile certificate, to support the con-
cept of domain-oriented access control approach for multiple domains.
Its purpose is only to convey (potentially incorrect, but probably cor-
rect) information between users and their associated domains. (Chapter
5)
• Designing the basic architecture for Encryption-Based Access Control
(EBAC) to achieve domain-oriented approach with flexible delegation,
and evaluating the advantages of revocation brought by EBAC. This is
the essential model for the LoT framework, and a novel application of
Identity-based Encryption techniques. (Chapter 5)
• Designing a Dual Capabilities Model, an extension of traditional capability-
based access control models (e.g. I-CAP), and developing a detailed
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protocol to fulfill the EBAC method. (Chapter 6)
The LoT framework does not intend to address the following challenges:
• Providing context-awareness services, for instance, (physical) location
information. This results from the different aspect from which the per-
vasive computing environment is understood in this dissertation. As in-
dicated above (see section 1.1), I focus upon the multiple domain context
which appears in most pervasive applications rather than their “smart-
ness”.
• Designing specific security mechanisms for a single domain (or a local
domain). This area has been considered by much past research work
and is now considerably matured. Moreover, LoT intends to give every
individual domain freedom to choose appropriate security mechanisms
to fulfill their own security requirements. Thus, our purpose is rather to
ensure that the heterogeneity challenge for the multiple domain context
can be met.
• Supporting privacy. For some applications, confidential personal infor-
mation can be gathered and provided by pervasive environments. Al-
though privacy is also one of the new challenges for pervasive environ-
ments, the discussion on this is out of the scope of this research.
1.6 Dissertation Outline
In this dissertation, I will describe the research work (essential process towards
to the design of the LoT framework) that has been done in past years. My
description will be focused upon the problem of security over multiple domains
with some example cases (which will be introduced gradually from chapter 4
to chapter 6) from pervasive environments.
The rest of this dissertation is organised as follows:
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Chapter 2 provides a structured overview of some related work. Most of
them have made significant direct impact on the outcome of my re-
search, and the rest have provided indirect inspiration upon which this
dissertation depends. This chapter begins with a review of the authen-
tication problem in both conventional environments and pervasive en-
vironments, followed by descriptions of various authorisation (or access
control) schemes. Then, it gives an overview of conventional revocation
systems but understood from the delegation perspective. The chapter
ends with a brief review of public key cryptography with a focus on
identity-based cryptography.
Chapter 3 introduces the notion of localisation of trust and the overall in-
frastructure for LoT. The intention here is not only to form a solid foun-
dation for the following chapters, but more importantly to explain why
LoT is needed for security over multiple domains. The LoT framework
is briefly described in a logical diagram, threat, policy and countermea-
sure, that follows the classic wisdom of designing a successful security
system. Prior to this description, the paradigm shift in security for the
multiple domain context is discussed in detail.
Chapter 4 describes a security mechanism for one end of LoT, authenti-
cation. This chapter includes a discussion of the essential unnecessity
of having a strong ID-based authentication for pervasive environments.
It also argues that the unique property of pervasive environments, hu-
man context, can be used positively to leverage the effectiveness of
mechanisms achieving authentication. Finally, this chapter presents a
two-channel authentication scheme and gives details of two protocols to
demonstrate the usefulness of the scheme.
Chapter 5 illustrates a domain-oriented approach for the other end of LoT,
authorisation. It provides descriptions of several concepts, including
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profile certificates, remote authorisation, and localised authentication,
that our domain-oriented access control mechanism builds on. More-
over, this chapter describes an architecture for Encryption-based access
control (EBAC) that is used to achieve LoT’s domain-oriented approach
for access control over multiple domains.
Chapter 6 extends the concepts proposed in chapter 5, and describes an im-
plementation (in the protocol level) of the domain-oriented EBAC ap-
proach using dual capabilities and partially trusted agents. The second
part of this chapter discusses a guest access scenario that can easily be
mis-regarded as a case of access control over multiple domains.
Chapter 7 concludes this dissertation by providing a critical evaluation of
this research against the thesis goals described in chapter 1 (see section
1.4 and 1.5). Then, it summarises the main contributions, identifies
various interesting features of LoT, and briefly discusses some potential
future research work. This chapter also gives some examples of other
areas that may benefit from deploying the techniques generated from
this research.
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Chapter 2
Background
In this chapter, we will present some previous works that are related to this
research. However, it is not our intention at all to provide a general sur-
vey of the state-of-the-art of those related works. Essentially, we will review
them regarding the problem that we are looking at in this dissertation. Thus,
we would like to focus only upon the aspects affecting this work, and fur-
ther to identify the problems of previous works. Note that, when the word
problem is mentioned in the rest of this chapter, it is by no means for the
purpose of criticism or negative implication. In fact, most of security systems
shown in this chapter work perfectly in their own contexts and assumptions
to solve the problems they are designed to solve. Nonetheless, those security
systems/mechanisms cannot be simply copied to other contexts, although a
lot of people do so in practice. In fact, it is also not those original system
designers’ intention to do this.
For most security systems, authentication, authorisation1, delegation and
revocation are the usual security mechanisms that are used to achieve desirable
security services (i.e. confidentiality, integrity and availability). Thus, we
will describe the conventional view of these major mechanisms, and start an
argument why the underlying implicit assumptions behind them may not be
1Authorisation here refers to the final stage of access control. We shall return to this
point later in section 2.2.
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the right ones for pervasive environments, where the multiple domain concept
in this dissertation is focused.
We will start by reviewing authentication from both conventional environ-
ments and the mobile context. Next, the concept of authorisation is described
with the focus upon the capability-based distributed systems, followed by a
review of delegation from the perspective of delegating both rights and re-
sponsibilities. We will then describe various schemes of revocation. Finally,
the major relevant work on public key cryptography including Identity-based
cryptography will be reviewed.
2.1 Authentication
In most literature, authentication is very often used to denote identity au-
thentication, that is, to answer the question “who said this” [19, 74]. It is
traditionally measured by one of three things, “something you know”, “some-
thing you are” or “something you have”, [109], depending upon the type of
identification being used. In recent years, however, a broader understanding
of authentication has emerged with the paradigm shift in the mobile context,
i.e. mobile ad-hoc network and pervasive computing. Hence, we are going to
review some works related to providing authentication in both conventional
environments and the mobile context.
2.1.1 What Authentication Protocols Are
Authentication is conventionally an important process to guarantee that prin-
cipals are who they claim to be [19, 82, 93]. It is normally accomplished by
verification at the other end of the communication from the claimant. Thus,
loosely speaking, an authentication protocol contains two major steps in the
real-time implementation. One is to construct a credential, something you
need to prove your identity explicitly. Most likely, a digital identity will be
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represented in some form involving cryptographic keys [96]. The second step,
known as verification, is to check the correctness of the credential provided by
the claimant, to avoid impersonation.
• Authentication credentials: in real life, the credential used to prove our-
selves can be many things, e.g. an ID-card or an officially signed docu-
ment, or a set of pre-arranged secret codes or phrases. Similarly, in the
digital world, the credential can be a shared key, a digital signature, or
a capability2. Thus, when a client requests a service, such as file access,
establishing a communication, and so forth, the client has to prove to
the verifier in some way, that they are in possession of those creden-
tials, and expects the recipient to recognise such credentials (which is
the verification step) so that the request can be granted.
• Verification: in most cases, this means to verify credentials. Typically,
verification is based upon sufficient knowledge which is frequently pre-
obtained. For instance, if using a digital signature as the authentication
credential, a verifier has to make sure that the correctness of the asso-
ciated public key has been validated already (also that it is still valid
when the request is committed). If a hash chain is employed to construct
authentication credentials, the hash pre-image ought to be delivered to
the verifier first (as shown in paper [5]).
For authentication protocols, it is important that the verifier is able to recog-
nise those credentials correctly, particularly when the claimant and the verifier
are in different domains. In conventional environments, it is usual to rely on
2The word capability here is different from the capability-based security systems that we
are going to introduce later in section 2.2.3. The capability here is a more general term,
and can be achieved by using certificates, one-way hash functions [56], hash chains [5] or
observations from the communications in secret societies [17].
26
a unique trusted infrastructure implemented in every domain, when the au-
thentication has to cross domain boundaries. Nevertheless, the nature of au-
thentication is different when the communication is on the fly. The difference
will be discussed in section 2.1.3.
2.1.2 Authentication in Conventional Environments
Authentication in conventional environments has been considerably well-developed
for decades, from the early Needham-Schroeder authentication protocol [93] to
public key certificates [65]. It always involves some form of proof of identity.
For the purpose of simplicity, here, we categorise those typical (conventional)
authentication techniques into two scenarios, Storable scenario and Delegable
scenario.
• Storable authentication
This scenario includes password, biometrics, and secret key systems
such as Kerberos3 [86]. Basically in these approaches, it is necessary
to keep a centralised database of information based upon users’ secrets
(e.g. hash value of passwords, users’ secret keys) and of personal bio-
metric data. The decision of authentication is based on the results of
required input information computationally matching pre-stored infor-
mation in the centralised database. Thus, strong security assumptions
for both challenge-response identification communication paths and re-
mote servers are required. One problem of many storable authentication
schemes (i.e. the password or biometrics applications) is the infeasibility
to terminate authentication. For many Internet authentication systems
for e-commerce, we need to register at the site with our carefully chosen
username/password and input our credit card information for the au-
thentication purpose. As argued in [110], there is no way to terminate
3In terms of the “ticket” element, Kerberos can also be considered under the second
scenario.
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the authentication if we no longer want an ongoing relationship with
the e-commerce site. We cannot revoke our username/password because
they never end (no expiration date associated with them). Also, the site
will have our credit card information in their database, which we really
do not want. In addition, the confinement problem emerges, particularly
when users in one domain attempt to interact with other users from other
domains. The compromise of one assumption (for example some attacks
on poorly chosen passwords [58]), or one domain (for example secret user
data in one domain is leaked) can bring about the collapse of trust in
the entire architecture. Thus, the second scenario has been considered
to address such problems.
• Delegable authentication
Compared with the storable scenario, delegable authentication has earned
much wider application due to its strong authentication performance
with the assistance of public key cryptography. This approach includes
public key certificates (as applied in PKIs [65] and PGP [132]), and to-
kenisation (or smart cards). Furthermore, we also lump capability-based
systems [89, 69, 57] into this scenario just for now, due to their crucial
relation between authentication and access control. Capability systems
were originally oriented towards access control rather than authentica-
tion, to the point that many papers do not regard them as authentication
mechanisms at all. We shall return to this point below (see section 2.2.3).
For the delegable scenario, the output of the authentication process is
justified by the input of authorised delegated capabilities being recog-
nised. It scales the proof of capability (e.g. certificate chain) from the
dedicated Trusted Third Parties (TTPs) or authorities in a transitive
way. The “triangle” of trust, among prover, verifier and global TTPs in
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one domain, is usually required during the authentication process. Con-
sequently, the Trust Transitivity problem [16, 25] arises. If Alice from
domain A trusts Bob from domain B on a particular event, and Bob
trusts Claire from domain C, then, the meaning of trust transitivity is
to allow us conclude that, Alice from domain A trusts Claire from do-
main C. Inevitably, this results in implementation difficulty (e.g. global
TTPs topology) and uncontrolled imposition of trust (e.g. the unfair
compulsion to fully trust arbitrary TTPs), particularly with the com-
munication crossing different domains in a manner which may be hard
for users to predict (which domains will a communication go through?).
In short, most conventional authentication schemes intend to construct a
binding between human users’ identities and their electronic identities, for in-
stance, a binding “people → key → capability” described in [27] (and usually
deployed in the delegable scenario, e.g. SPKI [43]). Such a binding is essen-
tially a task of a local domain in the first place, e.g. issuing a credential to
guarantee this kind of binding. Thus, when users attempt to interact with
some other users outside his (or her) own local domain, many TTPs present,
and are chained together to negotiate the recognition of, those credentials (e.g.
certification path in the PKI). However, there is no guarantee that the suc-
cess of security policy checking in one domain will be propagated across other
domains. Moreover, it is infeasible to deploy such an approach to some highly
decentralised applications, e.g. mobile ad-hoc communication.
2.1.3 Authentication On The Fly
Research for the security of mobile ad-hoc networks provides a different way to
understand authentication, particularly with the development of many perva-
sive computing applications. Increasingly, authentication is required between
two stranger entities (e.g. human users, devices) that are physically co-located
but without prior trust relationships. Such a highly decentralised, mobile and
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spontaneous mode of communications ensures the infeasibility of having a
TTPs approaches (e.g. Kerberos) to achieve authentication.
Authentication in decentralised circumstances is frequently referred to the
key exchange problem. This has been notably clarified by the Diffie-Hellman
protocol [41]. Two communicating parties self-generate an identical fresh ses-
sion key that is mathematically relevant to exchanged random bit-patterns be-
tween them. The preliminary of DH key agreement protocol is the assurance
of integrity in the message exchange channel, otherwise Man-in-the-Middle
attack will take place. However, such an assumption can barely be met in the
mobile ad-hoc context when the wireless radio channel is used. Many pro-
tocols [28, 9, 8, 50] have been approved to thwart Man-in-the-Middle attack
by manually involving a prior context (e.g. typing password or nonce value).
These key exchange protocols provide a good way to consider authentication
in circumstances that do not involve TTPs. Nevertheless, to exchange a prior
context securely will be cumbersome, when interactions intend to move to
many open and public locations. Peek-over-shoulder or relay attack can occur
in a similar way identified in “Chip and Spin” [6].
Efforts to secure pervasive computing and fundamental communication
structure (mobile ad-hoc networks) have received increasing attention in the
security research field, and are described in many papers from different per-
spectives. Many researchers have raised the possibility to design additional
security protocols which involve another physically independent secure chan-
nel (apart from the wireless radio channel). Some necessary cryptographic
materials (e.g. sharing the same session key, the knowledge of public key cer-
tificates) can be transferred via this secondary channel, and be verified later
on in the communications.
In their novel “Resurrecting Duckling” security model [120, 121], Stajano
and Anderson mark a physical contact idea as the second channel to bootstrap
trust between strangers. Moreover, based upon this approach, Balfanz et al.
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[13] introduce a pre-authentication process to exchange some relevant cryp-
tographic material in a demonstrative identification (physical recognition),
authentic and secure location-limited channel (such as infrared, ultrasound or
a short-wire). The image recognition from cameras [29], or a small token [31]
can also be regarded as such a channel. Then, the cryptographic information
(e.g. symmetric key, public key or other types of secrecy) exchanged via such a
channel will be deployed to authenticate or verify the following communication
in the open wireless medium.
In the spontaneous networking proposed by Feeney et al. [45], ad-hoc
network users retrieve a session key via IR (infrared) channel and use it to
secure the subsequent communications occurred in the insecure wireless RF
(radio frequency) channel. Given a simple example, a project team coming
from a number of organisations, gather together in a meeting room, the host
uses a PDA to generate a session key (s) for this meeting and distributes
it to each present meeting participant in a short-range IR communication
among each PDAs. Consequently, the session key s is shared by every meeting
participant and ready to encrypt the communication in the wireless radio
channel.
A similar idea can be obtained from Capkun et al. [22]. The authors intend
to use a short range connectivity mechanism, e.g. infrared or wire, as a secure
channel to exchange some cryptographic material (a binding of user’s name,
public key and node address in cleartext or in the form of hash value) and then
verify the signature or hash value of these prior-context submitted in the radio
channel. Furthermore, they extend their approach by introducing a “friends”
scenario to help establish a security association even between two strangers,
employing the same philosophy. One person (i) can require the binding (name,
public key and node address) of another person (j) from a “friend” f (who has
already established communication with j) signed by f , vice versa. Potentially,
they attempt to link the public keys with corresponding devices but avoid
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hierarchical or chained trust transitivity from trusted authorities. Despite the
situation that the authors consider central authority to be on-line only at the
initialisation phase and kept off-line afterwards, the involvement of unique
identity assigned by authority and (traditional) digital signature makes key
freshness and revocation cumbersome.
2.1.4 Authentication
A twin-channel threat model for ubiquitous computing is also suggested in
Creese et al.’s papers [34, 35] with the sampled protocols involving public
key certificates. One channel is the communication medium channel with
unreliable security, and the other is a more costly channel with higher security.
Meanwhile, Wong and Stajano [130] propose multi-channel protocols between
two wireless devices (at least one of which has camera ability) to perform
authentication. They pinpoint the fact that a single protocol may get benefits
from the use of different channels. The number and choice of channels that a
protocol can employ should depend upon the nature of different applications.
Consequently, as far as authentication is concerned in the mobile context,
we understand from the review of those works that its primary purpose is to
bootstrap the trust between two strangers. When the communications are on
the fly, such trust can be easily established from the deployment of additional
channels, rather than from knowledge of strangers’ identities. Moreover, it is
considerably more convenient to have those secondary channels because mobile
ad-hoc communications normally occur when the end points are in the vicinity
of each other.
Thus, in this dissertation, the term authentication is enlarged to a more
generic and broader term providing the authenticity of some necessary infor-
mation, instead of conventional identity authentication. For instance, it may
refer to authentication of a public key 4, or authentication of a credential. I
4From this perspective, I also regard the access-control oriented certificate-based systems
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will analyse this point more fully in chapter 4.
The security requirements in conventional environments and mobile con-
text are different in terms of authentication. Moreover, authentication needs
to be regarded as an end in itself, because for many cases authentication on
its own is the security requirement (e.g. bootstrapping the trust). However,
more often, authentication serves as a foundation to achieve access control.
2.2 Authorisation
Access control is essentially used to prevent unauthorised users from reading,
modifying or consuming information or resources, in addition to giving access
permissions to authorised users. Conceptually, the access control systems
firstly authenticate users using the appropriate authentication tools, then grant
their access if the requests correspond to their access rights 5. In this section,
we mainly focus upon the final stage of access control, which is also very often
described as authorisation.
Authorisation is usually regarded as the synonym of access control. The
process of authorisation (the access permissions process) is managed by the
access control matrix, that was introduced by Lampson [75] as a generalised
concept to protect operating systems originally. An access control matrix
contains rows that represent the active subjects, i.e. users in the system, and
columns that represent the passive objects, i.e. information or resources of
the system. In practice, thus, it appears in two separate forms, Access Control
List (ACL) that views the matrix by columns, and Capabilities that view the
matrix by rows. The access rights are specifically determined by an entry in
both cases.
to achieve authentication as a goal (in section 2.1.2).
5Alternatively, it can be achieved by encrypting data in a way that only authorised
recipients can decrypt it.
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In this section, we will give a brief discussion of ACL and extended role-
based access control. Then, we will focus upon capability-based access control.
2.2.1 Access Control List
A simple example of ACL is illustrated in figure 2.1. When a user requests
Figure 2.1: For each object, e.g. information data, resources, an ACL contains
a list of users and their associated access rights.
an access on a particular object, the system will look up the ACL for that
object to check whether the user has the appropriate access rights. ACL is
easy to implement because the access policy is managed centrally. However, as
explained in [4], it is less suited for the environment when the user population
is large and constantly changing, because every user needs an entry in the
ACL.
2.2.2 Role-based Access Control
The idea of Role-based Access Control (RBAC) is familiar from the implemen-
tation of the user groups described in UNIX. When we look at the user pool
more closely, we shall find that a large number of users can be categorised into
a small number of roles. We can think of those roles like the job functions
within a big organisation, e.g. directors, managers, secretaries or technicians.
Thus, only roles are needed in a system, and the necessary privileges can be
assigned to a user via those roles. Privileges here are a collection or a set of
access rights that a role is permitted to carry.
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Many different systems based upon RBAC [11, 53, 95, 106] have been
proposed since the 90’s. As illustrated in figure 2.2, however, the essential
components in RBAC are users, roles and privileges. A RBAC system first
assigns a user one (or more) pre-defined roles. Then, these roles will be checked
to see whether the access request is under the privileges associated with those
roles. For a single domain, RBAC has its own administrative advantage. For
Users Roles Privileges
Assigning 
Roles
Defining
Privileges
Figure 2.2: RBAC systems map users to roles, and then roles to privileges.
instance, when a user just joins the domain (or changes his job function),
it is considerably easier to assign this user a role than directly assign access
privileges to each object. However, it will be a struggle for a domain to
understand a stranger’s role (assigned by the other domains) in the multiple
domain context.
2.2.3 Capability-based Access Control
Alternatively, the access control matrix can be stored by rows, which is called
capability. As shown in figure 2.3, a pure capability is more flexible and can
be passed from one user to another user, compared with ACLs.
However, the pure capability is vulnerable to forgery, copying or modifica-
tion. Particularly, if a user possesses a capability, he/she is entitled to exercise
the access rights that are associated with this capability. It is hard to check
if the possession of this capability is genuine, or this user just simply steals or
forges this capability.
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Figure 2.3: For each user, a capability specifies what access rights are granted
to the possessor of this capability on each object.
Thus, the early Amoeba capability system described by Mullender [89]
deploys a protection mechanism, a tamper resistant and trusted F-box, to
address this problem 6. The purpose is to transform a port name into a
capability using the F-box at the network level. The port name is kept secret
from the user due to the one-way function of the F-box. Thus, when the
capability is presented by a user, Amoeba inputs the port name though the
F-box and compares the output result with the user’s capability. Moreover,
the capability in Amoeba can be passed from one user to another user freely,
and Amoeba does not regard this form of propagation as a threat. However,
the free propagation makes it problematic to enforce the confinement property
[60], as a capability is both necessary and sufficient to access resources within
the system, for example, the capability may be passed to a malicious user.
As a consequence, a secure capability is often deployed to ensure confine-
ment. It is normally achieved by two general methods.
1. One technique is to check the ID of the user (who presents the capability)
at the time of using the capability, e.g. Karger’s S-CAP [69] or Gong’s
I-CAP [57]. In S-CAP, a capability is necessary but not sufficient to gain
access. The system checks the current access control policy, whenever a
6Mullender did not actually implement his conceptual model as described. F-box still
uses ID in the implementation and consequently Amoeba does not enforce security policies
as Mullender originally intended.
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capability is used. For instance, the system will check the identity of the
user (who presents the capability), and look up the ACL to determine
whether or not to grant an access. This approach is not flexible and
requires the entire system apply the same security policy. S-CAP, how-
ever, was not designed for multiple domain applications. It is infeasible
to assume every domain will, or can, adopt the same security policy.
2. The propagation of capabilities can be restricted, for example by limiting
the delegation of capabilities to other users [115]. Note that I-CAP also
uses this second technique to address capability propagation between
domains and the capability revocation problem by constructing a prop-
agation tree. In I-CAP, when a user Alice wishes to delegate her rights
on a resource to another user Bob, Alice needs to submit this request
to the resource server S (who issued her the capability). The resource
server would generate a proper (external) capability for Bob. More im-
portantly, the server can draw a tree to monitor the propagation of the
access rights associated with this capability.
In contrast to some capability-based systems introduced previously, Gong’s
I-CAP [55] is designed keeping multiple domains in mind. Potentially, the do-
main in an I-CAP system is not geography-based. To clear the concern of
capabilities being stolen or lost, it introduces two forms capabilities, exter-
nal and internal capabilities. The resource server generates a random number
R0 for a resource Object. The internal capability (Object,R0) is only known
by the server. Then, the servers computes R1, which is the hashed value of
the group (IDuser,Object,AccessControl,R0) for a local user in the system.
The external bit-pattern (IDclient,Object,AccessControl,R1) is delegated to
the corresponding user. As a result, different users hold different bit-pattern
which corresponds to capabilities for the same object. Unfortunately, I-CAP
suffers from the freshness problem because the value R1 is put within the
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(external) capability instead of being constructed at the time when the ac-
cess is requested. Essentially, the I-CAP system requires a good underlying
authentication mechanism to address the freshness problem.
Nonetheless, a sound idea of I-CAP is the definition of two forms of ca-
pabilities, external and internal representation. Only one internal capability
need be generated for each object in the resource domain. For different do-
mains, distinct external capabilities are computed for the same object based
upon the internal capability, domain ID and corresponding access rights. The
internal capability is always kept secret in the resource’s local domain. The
external capability is forced to have different bit patterns for different domains
for the “same” capability. If the external capability is considered as the ac-
cess credential between domains, the compromise of one domain does not help
the attacker to gain any information of usable forms of external capabilities
in other domains. The collusion of some misbehaving domains still cannot
help the attacker. Moreover, by separating capabilities, I-CAP actually solves
the confinement problem implicitly. Also, it can avoid the domino effect of
security compromise to the other relative domains.
The logic of delegation has been considered in many authorisation systems,
particularly the capability-based access control scenario. It is an important
concept abstracted from access control, and we are going to review it separately
in the next section.
2.3 Delegation
When a resource is shared across domain boundaries, the access requests from
users are not always local. By using delegation, a user can allow some other
users, possibly in another domain, to do some operations.
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2.3.1 Certificate-based Delegation Schemes
With the intention to support authorisation in PKI, SPKI [43] associates users’
public keys with their access rights rather than their identities. In principle,
every entity (e.g. a server, a user) has its own public/private key pair. They
can sign a certificate for any other users to whom they would like to transfer
some rights. The signed authorisation certificates bind the proper rights with
the owner. Hence, when the certificate is verified by the service owner or
other users, the attributes embedded in the certificate are checked against
the access request. Authorities (access rights) performing some actions are
delegated flexibly among public keys. Based upon the SPKI certificates, Aura
[10] introduces some concepts of delegation certificates. It also delegates access
rights with signed certificate, but provides a useful discussion for certificate-
based delegation.
Another mechanism that has been used to achieve delegation is proxies
[94, 118]. A proxy 7(sometimes called token) contains the information identi-
fying both its delegator and the delegatee. Thus, these schemes require a user
to prove its identity. This requirement is often strongly linked to the deploy-
ment of public key certificates. For instance, a delegator signs a proxy with
its private key and hands over to a delegatee. When this proxy is presented to
a third party (i.e. the service provider), this third party needs to contact the
authentication server to verify the proxy. SAProxies [81, 80] cleverly address
this problem by letting the delegator bind his public key certificate (PKC)
with the proxy token. A digest (only the signature part) of the delegator’s
PKC is included in the proxy instead of the delegator’s ID or name. By doing
so, the proxy becomes a Self Authenticating Proxy (SAProxy). It contains a
delegatee’s name, (the digest of) the delegator’s PKC, the resource (or object)
identifier, and delegated access rights (on this particular object), in addition
7The term “proxy” used in this context is not related to proxy servers/services.
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to the expiry date. The delegator signs this proxy before handing over to
the delegatee. When the delegatee intends to initiate an access request, he
needs to include this proxy into his signed request. Since the PKC contains
the delegtor’s public key that can be used to verify the proxy itself, a verifier
can check in his local area without retrieving any information from on-line au-
thentication servers for verification. This feature seemingly makes SAProxies
a desirable candidate to solve cross-domain authentication problem.
Nevertheless, like other certificate-based delegation schemes, inevitably, a
common problem for SAProxies is the inherent revocation problem, when the
access requests cross domain boundaries. If a user in the chain stops trusting
something, it is hard to stop the proxy chain of trust. Thus, the system still
requires a unique trusted infrastructure to be deployed in every domain that
has been involved in the chain of delegation, to update revoked certificates or
tokens. This is not what we really want for the case of multiple domains.
2.3.2 Delegation of Responsibility
Differing from the delegation of rights that have been discussed above, Crispo
proposes a neat idea of delegation of responsibility in his Ph.D dissertation
[36]. In his viewpoint, delegation is not merely defined as delegation of rights.
He points out that it may be necessary not only to delegate rights but also
the responsibilities associated with these rights for some applications (where
the sharing of responsibility would result in accountability problems). When a
user Alice delegates some rights, e.g. open the shop’s safe while she is away, to
another user Bob, it is important to distinguish whether the access (“opening
the safe”) is performed by Alice, or by Bob acting on her behalf. This is where
delegation of responsibility comes to play.
Delegation of responsibility may or may not imply that the associated
rights are transferred from Alice to Bob. However, in this example Alice
should not be able to open the shop’s safe any more, while she is away. This
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essentially reduces the amount of trust that is required to enhance the security
policies.
Both delegation of rights and delegation of responsibility show the im-
portance of trust between delegators and delegatees. The basic principle in
delegation is delegators have to trust delegatees who will act on their behalves.
We will look at this trust issue next.
As a concept, the notion of trust has been defined differently depending
upon the context of applications. It is important to understand trust not only
because many security systems are actually constructed from it (implicitly or
explicitly), but more importantly because of its relationship to the need for
revocation. A typical example is the trust management approach (see section
2.3.3), which is essentially delegated access control with the extended relation
to trust.
In this dissertation, we are going to follow a simple definition of trust
from Christianson and Harbison [25] to explain the principle of trust. Note
that it only focuses upon some necessary principles of trust in the context of
this dissertation. We do not by any means intend to discuss a concrete trust
management infrastructure or trust model here.
In their work [25], Christianson and Harbison argue that trust can be
considered as the conjunction of Honesty and Competence. Thus, “A trusts B
on a statement of some knowledge X (in short, A trusts B)”, can be unpacked
as:
If (A believes (B says X)), then,
A believes X.
This statement can be further translated to the conjunction of,
• trust in honesty :
If (A believes (B says X)), then,
A believes (B believes X).
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• trust in competence:
If (A believes (B believes X)), then,
A believes X.
Thus, the belief generated from trust has to come from both honesty and
competency statements. One statement alone cannot produce the belief. For
instance, if only “A believes (B believes X)” is stated, it does not necessarily
mean that “A believes X”. Alice and Bob may have different security re-
quirements based upon different threat models. This results in the fact that
Alice and Bob may have different beliefs even for the same thing, e.g. Bob
believes this program is running safely in his computer because of his faith in
his updated anti-virus software. Alice does not know this. Alice may not trust
the anti-virus software. Or simply, she may not have the anti-virus software
installed at all. Moreover, neither of those two statements is reversible. If “A
believes (B believes X)” is stated, it does not necessarily mean “A believes
(B says X)”.
Roughly speaking, a belief (on something) can be generated from either
knowledge or trust. Knowledge (in the sense of true justified belief) is in
principle transferable: we can pass knowledge over to other people 8. However,
in practice transferring knowledge is problematic in a distributed environment.
Consequently, in protocol analysis, trust is often used to provide a substitute
for knowledge (for instance, to justify taking the next step in the protocol).
Statements of trust are not transitive, even in principle: Bob cannot transfer
his trust in Carol to Alice. In other words, if Alice trusts Bob about something
and Bob trusts Carol about the same thing, it does not necessarily mean that
Alice will trust Carol about the same thing. Moreover, trust is non-monotonic
8In real life, the definition of knowledge can be more complicated than that which I have
described here. Some “knowledge” may be abstracted from some “trust” statements. For
those cases, knowledge cannot be passed on (similar to trust). However if A knows that B
knows X, then A knows X.
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which explains the importance of revocation (see section 2.4).
2.3.3 Trust and Policy Based Delegation Schemes
The root of trust and policy based delegation can be traced back to the idea of
a trust management scheme. Trust management is first introduced by Blaze et
al. in their PolicyMaker [16] and KeyNote system [15]. It provides a framework
for specifying and interpreting users’ security policies, security credentials and
their trust relationships.
Policies in trust management systems are purely for local use, and creden-
tials are usually signed certificates. These certificates are similar to SPKI,
binding public keys to assertions delegating authorisation to perform actions
(that they are trusted to sign for). A programmable language that is easy
for humans to read is usually implemented in trust management systems. In
practice, the resource owner (S) obtains certificates from users who request
actions. After verifying the signatures on certificates as well as the validity
of the certificates, S submits a user request, certificates and local policy de-
scription (of this particular action) to the local trust management engine (e.g.
PolicyMaker). Then, the access decision will be made if approved.
From our perspective, a fruitful point is what Blaze called “locality of
control” [16]. By supporting local control of trust relationships, a globally
known hierarchy of certificate authorities can be avoided. This useful remark is
being extended by many works [20, 38, 48, 62, 67, 114, 131] to construct a trust-
based or policy-based system (mostly associated with the RBAC mechanism)
in different contexts. For instance, Trust Establishment (TE) from Herzberg
et al. [62] is designed to assign roles to strangers. The Trust Policy Language
(TPL) is presented to map stranger users to predefined roles, based upon
certificates that are issued by a third party (e.g. a TTP or a user). A TPL
rule defines some requirements, such as the issuer needs to belong to a specific
group, and conditions for joining a role. In his Ph.D dissertation [38], Das
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Chowdhury looks at trust management from a different aspect and applies
it in the context of privacy. His approach separates ID management from
trust management and therefore delegation can be done anonymously. This is
achieved by the use of a surrogate, which is constructed from the ring signature
scheme [102]. A surrogate does not unveil a delegatee’s ID but implies the
delegatee is trusted by a delegator for this particular transaction. Thus, trust
is localised within the system.
Kagal et al. [67, 68] target the security challenges which have arisen from
lack of central control and rarely predetermined users in the pervasive com-
puting environment. Their systems are also built from XML language to form
distributed trust rather than just user authentication and access control. It is
impossible for a security manager to understand a foreign user Bob’s role in
accessing some resources. Hence, Bob requests permission from a local user
Alice, who can delegate access rights to anyone she trusts, according to local
security policy. Alice hands over to Bob a signed delegation certificate that
implies the proper access rights are delegated to Bob. Then, Bob’s request
will be granted after he sends the security manager this delegation certificate
along with his identity certificate. The trust-based systems will make the final
decision based upon the policy check, e.g. whether Alice’s rights are revoked.
Also, this final decision-making process can be based upon recommendations
(as described in [114]) or history (see paper [48] 9).
These trust-based schemes, do not themselves implement certificate distri-
bution or revocation services. Instead, they have to rely upon some external
programs because signed certificates for delegation are frequently used.
An urgent problem for most delegation schemes is how to revoke the del-
egated tasks, particularly for the chain of delegation. Again, when delegation
occurs, the system needs to consider stopping the chain of trust once a user
9Following the social impact of the small world phenomenon [85], Galice et al. argue
that two users can find the common users they have met before, when they meet for the
first time. Those history-based elements are seen as a bond to manage trust.
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stops trusting something. Hence, from our perspective, delegation has to be
considered closely with revocation.
2.4 Revocation
The term revocation has frequently been limited to certificate revocation. In
essence, an issued public key certificate (for identification or access control) has
to be invalidated before its defined expiry date, perhaps due to a compromise
of a user’s private key, affiliation change, withdrawal of operations and other
unpredictable reasons [47, 65, 90]. However, it is also sometimes necessary to
revoke some specific delegated privileges, for instance, a capability, or a role
in most access control systems. In this dissertation, consequently, by means
of revocation, I mean the revocation of access in addition to (conventional)
certificates revocation.
2.4.1 The Principle of Trust
Following the notion of trust discussed on page 41, there are three essential
principles for trust as far as this dissertation is concerned,
• Trust is subjective: for the same statement, different users will have dif-
ferent viewpoints of trust based upon their own assumptions and threat
model. It is infeasible to have global trust.
• Trust is context-dependent : the statement of trust is dependent on the
specific context of applications. Interestingly, we can say, for example,
“I may trust A to introduce a car sales assistant to me, however, I may
not trust A to introduce a mortgage representative to me”.
• Trust is non-monotonic: the statement of trust may (and most likely
will) change dynamically over the time. For instance, “I trust A at time
t1”, however, at time t2 (where t2 > t1), I may not trust A, and I may
trust A again at time t3 (where t3 > t2). Thus, trust is not permanent.
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Thus, some trust assumptions may no longer exist under some circumstances,
particularly when users cannot tell the future. That is where revocation is
needed.
2.4.2 Various Revocation Schemes
Consider (public key) certificates, it is revocation which makes certificates
non-monotonic [79]. Conventionally, certificate revocation policies are usually
decided by the CAs that issue the certificates. A typical implementation is the
periodically published off-line Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) [65], either
containing a positive (listing certificates which are still validated at the time
of issue) or negative (the certificates which are expired or revoked) statement.
Alternatively, on-line revocation authorities, which were introduced by Crispo
and Lomas [37], are used in OCSP [91] to respond to users’ queries regarding
the validity of certificates. However, these approaches are not suitable for
decentralised multiple domain environments. In fact, even in the conventional
environment, significant expense is required to solve the revocation problem
by using these conventional mechanisms [14], such as the transmission costs
and the infrastructural costs.
A much more promising revocation mechanism is designed by Micali in his
Novomodo system [83, 84]. Micali’s revocation system involves a CA, one or
more (publicly semi-trusted) directories. The basic scheme is based upon the
use of hashed chains. For each user, the CA chooses a random number X0,
and repeatedly calculates its hashed value n times by using a public one-way
hash function H{},
Xn, where Xi = H{Xi−1}
The value of n is subject to the revocation policies defined by the CA. For
example, it can be total days of the month (e.g. “30”), if the CA checks the
validity of certificates on a daily basis. Xn is included in the (traditional)
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certificate along with other information. On the ith day after issuing the
certificate, the CA sends H{Xn−i} to the directories if the user’s certificate
is still valid. Otherwise, it does not send this value. Thus, when a user Bob
submits his certificate to a resource server Carol on the ith day, Carol retrieves
Xn from Bob’s certificate, then queries a directory for obtainingH{Xn−i}. The
verification is done once Carol finds whether the following equation stands,
H i{Xn−i} = Xn,
where H i{} is to hash the value repeatedly i times.
If it is held, Bob’s certificate is still validated, otherwise, the certificate is
revoked (at least for that day). It is an efficient revocation approach, because,
• The verifiers do not need to trust the directories, as only CAs can pro-
duce the hashed pre-image of Xn. Thus, those directories are semi-
trusted.
• CAs do not need to be on-line all the time. More importantly, Micali’s
revocation system can revoke users’ certificates selectively. If a user’s
certificate is only invalidated temporarily, the CA can just stop sending
the value of H{Xn−i} for the “frozen” duration. Once a user is back into
action, the CA can simply start to generate the proper H{Xn−i} from
this instance, without re-setting the system from the beginning.
Gentry [51] also adopts this neat idea but implements it using pair-based
cryptography to address the third-party queries problem, when users use their
public key pairs for encryption/decryption rather than signature.
Moreover, Rivest [98] suggests that the revocation policies should be set
by the “acceptor” (for instance, the service provider or a third party verifier)
rather than CAs. The “signer” (i.e. the certificate holders) should supply the
necessary recent information (with the assistance from CAs, e.g., short-lived
certificates or some recent statements as described in [123]) as the evidence
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of its validity instead of another way around. He also argues that revocation
should have different semantics with respect to different reasons to revoke. For
example, for (private) key compromise, it is unnecessary to get CAs involved
at all. The certificate-holder can simply sign a suicide note declaring the key
has been compromised or dead and publish it. The idea of suicide is also
used by Moore et al. [30, 88] recently to address node revocation problems in
ad-hoc networks 10.
Revocation has always been viewed as a both difficult and complex fea-
ture to implement, particularly in a capability-based system [70]. It is hard
to grasp, although some previous works have examined it from different per-
spectives. The revocation of access privileges has been discussed by Khurana
and Gligor in [73] (using attribute certificates as the example). They propose
that it is necessary to do selective revocation, when both attribute certificate
and identity certificate are implemented in the system. Meanwhile, transitive
revocation is needed to revoke delegation chains.
One interesting way to fulfill revocation in the context of confidentiality
can be observed from ID-based Cryptography (IBC) which will be reviewed
in the next section.
2.5 A Short History of Public Key Cryptog-
raphy
In this section, we will give an (over-brief) history of public key cryptography
(PKC) with the attention on IBC, which is a twist of PKC. Additionally,
following the development track of PKC, we have also observed that many
PKC systems (unfortunately) produce another problem to replace the one
which they successfully resolve.
10Basically, when an ad-hoc networking node believes or perceives another (neighbouring)
node has misbehaved, their “radical” strategy is to let this node publish a suicide note
announcing both the misbehaving node and himself are dead.
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It seemed that all security problems go away when public key cryptography
appeared in 1976. In the PKC scenario, e.g. RSA [101], ElGamal [42] system
and other variants including Schnorr’s scheme [111], a user Alice keeps her
private key secret as well as “broadcasting” associated public key to the others.
It is (mathematically and computationally) hard to retrieve private keys based
upon the knowledge of corresponding public keys. As a consequence, the other
users are “guaranteed” that the message encrypted under Alice’s public key
can only be seen by Alice herself. In addition, any messages that can be verified
by Alice’s public key are “truly” signed by Alice. However, the great concern
is the problem of public key distribution, that is, how to associate a public
key with the correct participant as discussed by Christianson and Malcolm in
[27], particularly in a multiple domain case. As illustrated in figure 2.4, it is
not convincing for Bob from domain B that a public key claimed by “Alice”
(from domain A) is really the one associated with Alice, not another public
key “owned” by Evil.
Key Server
   
(PK, SK) What is Alice’s Public Key?
PK is Alice’s Public Key
Cross domain reference
Key Server
   
(PK, SK)
What is Alice’s Public Key?
PK’ is "Alice’s" Public Key
Cross domain reference
(PK’,SK’)
??? PK’
Figure 2.4: Evil can interfere with the public key distribution channel and
simply do “man-in-the-middle” attack.
As a consequence, PKIs have introduced dedicated (trusted) authorities.
These reside in each domain, and their sole role is to issue a fresh certificate
associating public keys with the legitimate participants (mostly in the form of
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their identities). Inevitably, trust transitivity [25] (from the chain of certifi-
cates) has to be required when the communication is taking place over multiple
domains. This solves the public key distribution problem after involving an
underlying trusted infrastructure. However, as shown in figure 2.5, it becomes
problematic to revoke certificates. Moreover, a unique trusted infrastructure
spanning every domain require every player to understand a lot about foreign
domains.
CA in Domain A
CA in Domain B
Chain or Hierarchy
(PK, SK)
Cross domain reference
What is Alice’s Public Key?
Certs
Certs
CAs say PK is Alice’s Public Key
CA in Domain A
CA in Domain B
Chain or Hierarchy
(PK, SK)
Cross domain reference
What is Alice’s Public Key?
Certs
Certs_new
CAs ’say’ (said) PK is Alice’s Public Key
??? say or said
??? who are ’authorities’
Figure 2.5: Bob believes PK is Alice’s public key only because authorities say
so.
The PGP scheme [132] provides a different way to target the public key
distribution problem. It is a more decentralised approach than a typical PKI
system. In practice, a PGP user can submit her public key to some well-known
public keys repositories on the Internet. Then, she may employ another dif-
ferent channel over which she has most control (e.g. her personal webpage),
to publish the fingerprint (hashed value of the public key) of her current pub-
lic key. Thus, the third party can verify the authenticity of her public key
obtained from a public repository. However, PGP does not really solve some
inherent problems of PKC (such as certificate revocation requiring transmis-
sion of trust along key chains).
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In 1985, Shamir proposed a different public-key cryptosystem, Identity-
based cryptography [113]. IBC had not received enough attention until some
schemes based upon pairing [18, 24, 52, 64] were proposed after 2000. Shamir’s
novel approach is for any pair of users to communicate with each other in a
secure way without cryptographic key exchange, key repositories or directories,
or services from a third party in a remote domain. In principle (as shown in
figure 2.6), IBC associates a user’s identification with key pairs by defining
public keys as the ID (with some redundancies).
Private Keys
 Generation
    Locally 
PK for Alice=ID_Alice
Alice’s ID is 
Requests SK
 
Issues SK Local domain reference
Alice@herts.ac.uk
Figure 2.6: Bob does not require any prior crypto-knowledge about Alice to
construct her public key. Moreover, public key freshness is met by putting in
some extra information, e.g., IDAlice = h(Alice@herts.ac.uk, currentdate)
Based upon the description in paper [18], some cryptographic requirements
for IBC are (briefly) highlighted below,
• Each domain has a local and (only) locally trusted third party, Private
Key Generator (PKG). It sets up publicly known system parameters
(Params) including the domain’s public key, and a privately master
secret, s (randomly chosen). More importantly, the PKG is also respon-
sible for extracting a private key K−Alice for Alice. It is associated with her
public key, K+Alice = IDinfoAlice by inputting Params, s and IDinfoAlice.
For the underlying algorithm,
– Given a seed s, it is easy to compute a K− for any possible K+.
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– Given any pair of (K+,K−), it is infeasible to compute s.
• When Bob needs to encrypt a message (M) using IDinfoAlice, he does,
Inputting Params, IDinfoAlice and M → Ciphertext(C)
In IBC systems, a user, Alice, only needs to trust her local PKG for is-
suing her the right private key. From our perspective, this feature is really
important for the multiple-domain context because trust is established locally.
An additional authentication mechanism is required to be in place before the
private key issuing process, however, it is not difficult to achieve this in a local
domain. It is also a flexible approach, as the PKG does not need to generate
a private key for local users beforehand. A player, Alice, can choose any arbi-
trary bit-patten as her ID regarding her local domain’s policies. The PKG will
be happy to issue her the private key associated with the IDinfo she submits,
as long as she can pass the local authentication process.
In recent years, many other works have also been developed based upon
the basic principle of IBC, including certificate-based [51] and certificateless
[2] schemes targeting the inherent key escrow problem in the basic IBC setting
11, authenticated key agreement protocols [12, 116] and access control oriented
schemes [61, 117].
A problem for IBC is that a malicious user Alice can set up a fake domain.
Like other domains, this fake domain’s public key is known to all players. Bob
would expect Alice’s domain to have a control over her misbehaviour by not
issuing her the proper private key. However, since the domain is fake, Alice’s
private key is always available to her. IBC does not have an extra mechanism
to stop this happening. However, the importance of IBC for our work is the
mechanism of localising the trust.
11A basic IBC system allows the PKG to generate a user’s private key and every user’s
private key is known by the PKG.
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2.6 Conclusions
This chapter has presented an overview of the research on which this thesis is
built, from authentication, authorisation, delegation and revocation aspects.
It has also briefly reviewed the development of public key cryptography. We
opt to describe only the semantics of those works rather than illustrating
protocols in detail. Also, some of those researches are essentially overlapping
and provide different security services.
In the succeeding chapters we will show how some of these works can
be adapted for the design of our work in the multiple domain context. The
next chapter will describe the basic infrastructure of our work based upon the
nature of relationships, threat modeling, security policy and security counter-
measures, for secure systems design.
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Chapter 3
The Need for
Localisation-of-Trust
This chapter introduces Localisation-of-Trust (or LoT), a security framework
to provide necessary services in the multiple domain context. It begins with
a description of the contextual change for security in pervasive environments.
Then, in section 3.2 I illustrate an overview of the LoT framework, pinpointing
the basic infrastructure and key concepts. These concepts serve as a basis for
LoT. Section 3.3 explains a major issue concerned with LoT, talking to correct
strangers. In section 3.4, the localising of trust security principle is described
and the need of it for the multiple domain context is discussed. This chapter
ends with the outline of the exampled security mechanisms provided by LoT.
LoT examines them from two ends, authentication and authorisation, and
proposes a tool-kit of security countermeasures for pervasive environments.
3.1 Paradigm Shift in Security
Security in the multiple domain context has not been highly researched as a
whole in conventional environments (i.e. distributed computing, mobile com-
puting 1). A major argument is that a successful protocol targeting one domain
can “easily” be lifted to multiple domains. This is mainly fulfilled with the
1Arguably, the mobile computing environment is not usually considered to be “conven-
tional”. However, from the domain perspective described in this dissertation, most mobile
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necessary assistance from a globally trusted infrastructure. In essence, the
same protocols are unconsciously being used for different context. A Swiss
Army Knife like protocol has already been viewed with alarm [92]. It will be
more dangerous to implement it in pervasive environments in particular be-
cause pervasive users are more likely from different domains that have different
assumptions and threats. Moreover, many pervasive interactions may occur
in several different environments. However, with the development of pervasive
environments, the paradigm of security for multiple domains has shifted.
The most obvious change for pervasive environments is the basic wireless
connection, frequently in the ad-hoc manner. If a pervasive environment only
replaces wires with wireless RF media, then to secure pervasive environments
is not too hard, considering the well developed cryptosystems described in
chapter 2. However, the new challenges [35, 45, 121], for instance, poorly de-
fined network boundaries, dynamic enrollment, no pre-configuration, transient
association and decentralised infrastructure, have entailed a massive qualita-
tive change in security requirements.
Most of all, as far as this dissertation is concerned, the primary change in
pervasive environments is the need to provide necessary security requirements
over multiple domains. Again, by means of domains, I emphasise the difference
of security policies rather than geographic locations. Those requirements are
different from what we have experienced in conventional environments (i.e.
distributed computing or mobile computing). It is mainly manifest in the
following respects:
• Prior knowledge for interactions. In conventional environments, we have
pre-obtained knowledge about the communication which is going to oc-
cur. Hence, most security protocols heavily involve the necessary process
of identifying communicating entities by their names (or their attributes)
computing applications are still based on access in a single domain, which could be consid-
ered a conventional scenario.
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directly, or some ID-proof forms indirectly. The information used to
prove identities explicitly could be, e.g. a password, a shared secret
key or a digital signature. In a pervasive environment, we are most un-
likely to know in advance the communication we are going to interact.
Thus, it is cumbersome to retrieve those identity related proofs before
interactions occur, or even to find out how to do it.
• Filtering bad guys in the network protocol level. Conventionally, differ-
ent networks are physically distinguished and therefore network bound-
aries are clearly defined. It is feasible to place a properly configured
gateway between two networks, analysing the incoming/outcoming data
streams throughout the network. Any suspicious or unexpected infor-
mation from outside of the network will be blocked if necessary. Most
pervasive applications take place in a unpredictable way and are man-
aged without any external configuration. Explicitly, such a self-organised
network infrastructure implies the absence of sharp network boundaries.
It results in the fact that the inside and outside of the network are
not clearly distinguishable. As a consequence, a conventional gate-
way/firewall approach to secure the network protocol level cannot secure
a pervasive environment, because the network boundary is not clear and
well-defined [45]. In addition, to block unwanted traffic cannot address
an internal attack. A malicious user in a pervasive environment can
roam among many networks so that the attacker may already be inside
network gateways.
• Dependence on a pre-established or centralised trust infrastructure. A
conventional approach is to have some trusted third parties (TTPs) on
a global scale, for instance, symmetric-key based Kerberos systems [86],
early X.509 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) [65] and SPKI/SDSI system
[99, 43]. The security decision-making for a certain purpose is handled
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by the presence of those TTPs, and we hope that they will be properly
configured within a domain. This does not suit a pervasive environment
due to the decentralised character of pervasive communications. More
significantly, neither TTPs, e.g. Certificate Authorities (CAs), nor a
global infrastructure is always accessible when a particular security de-
cision has to be made on a specific communication session. This leads
to the problem of delegation and revocation as stated early in chapter 2.
Also, it seems to be unrealistic to require every pervasive user to carry
their own infrastructures around, because of the computational resource
limitations on those daily objects.
Considering these security impacts, the multiple domain context (in particular,
a pervasive environment), requires a contextual change of nature for security.
We must guarantee that we can identify the correct user and its properly
associated access rights in order to achieve desirable levels of security. These
security requirements are usually achieved by two ends, authentication 2 and
authorisation. With the paradigm shift in the multiple domain context, those
two security ends are changing when we intend to routinely talk to significant
numbers of stranger human users or devices spontaneously and dynamically.
We have no prior knowledge about the names/IDs, or roles of those to whom
we are going to talk, or which kind of privilege a user needs to access resources.
In the meanwhile, we cannot totally rely upon the infrastructure to make the
right decision for us. In order to address those classic security problems but
in a new context, I propose a Localisation-of-Trust (or LoT) framework.
3.2 Overview of the LoT Framework
LoT is a framework to provide necessary security requirements involving mul-
tiple domains, a pervasive environment for instance. It can also be used to
2In this dissertation, the term authentication is mainly used for user authentication if no
specific meaning is given.
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advantage in conventional environments (i.e. distributed system, mobile com-
puting). However, the focal interest of my work is pervasive environments, as
pervasive computing is the richest case of security over multiple domains. The
LoT framework intends to investigate the security problems over multiple do-
mains from the two logical ends, authentication and authorisation, due to the
inevitable difference with the single domain case for the nature of bootstrap-
ping trust. In a conventional meaning, authentication is to determine “who
is speaking?” or, “who is making statements?” and authorisation is usually
about “who is trusted?” or, “the statements made by whom are trusted” [1].
Generally speaking, authentication is mainly used to bootstrap access control.
In this dissertation, by means of authentication, I mean this generic meaning
of bootstrapping access control. I do not (just) mean conventional ID-based
authentication. Thus, access control is essential and authentication is not
primary.
In the rest of this dissertation, it will be noticed that most statements in
LoT are heavily towards access control, or trust establishment. This is because,
firstly, bootstrapping trust naturally requires something different; secondly, it
is a harder problem to establish trust with variations. Last, authentication (the
generic term) is essentially the minimal level of access control. Consequently,
I focus more upon the access control problem, and the LoT framework will be
“deliberately” presented in a more access-control-like style and expressions for
the discussion.
The LoT framework is delivered as a result of acknowledging the signifi-
cance of the local domain’s knowledge. It is based upon a systematic policy
of localising trust. As matter of principle, each domain in the LoT frame-
work intends to deal only with their own security policy explicitly, rather than
messing around with that of other domains. Most currently existing security
systems tend to force a user to understand other domains’ policies when he/she
intends to access some resources in those domains. From security’s viewpoint,
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it is difficult and, I will argue, unnecessary to do so. Therefore, I would like
to provide an alternative in this dissertation and propose the LoT framework.
LoT is based upon the localising the trust security design principle, which en-
courages domains (precisely, domain servers or administrative authorities) to
get involved with their local users’ communication. In LoT,
• A user may be a human, a computer, a portable computerised device, a
program, or a process, etc.
• A domain is very flexible depending upon the context and its own policy.
A user can set up one domain or several domains for different security
purposes and fitting into different environments.
Figure 3.1 gives an overview for the LoT framework. This infrastructure is
designed to minimise trust assumptions, and provide desirable security services
in an effective and efficient way.
Security Policy 
Threat
Countermeasures / 
Mechanisms
Talking to the wrong strangers
Localising the Trust 
Two Channels Authentication
Encryption-based 
Access Control Guests Access
Strangers Access
Figure 3.1: The LoT framework overview
1. Threat: In pervasive environments, we intend to talk to strange users
frequently in a dynamic and spontaneous manner. Generally speak-
ing, the main threat for pervasive environments is to talk to incor-
rect strangers. Those strangers are usually from many different do-
mains. They may be a strange user from a friendly domain, or a friendly
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user from a strange domain. Amongst them, most likely, secure pre-
knowledge (e.g. crypto-key information) or trust relationships have not
been established. For solving this, conventionally, an infrastructure, such
as Kerberos [122], PKI, etc. is introduced to help users to determine
correct strangers usually by verifying their IDs, names, long-term public
keys, or roles. The trusted infrastructure has its required assumptions.
Thus, inevitably, users have to set up their own assumptions and secu-
rity policy in accordance with those of the infrastructure. However, the
semantics of the threat model will be different due to the nature of appli-
cations, particularly in pervasive environments. The threat is specific to
the requirements from different pervasive applications and assumptions
which will not be known to the infrastructure. As a consequence, it must
not let infrastructure decide local policy.
2. Security Policy: the main security design guideline in security policy
is localising trust principle. It is difficult to establish trust in a pervasive
environment, if users have to struggle to understand a foreign domain’s
policy and precise semantics of security mechanisms. Thus, we have to
seek significant assistance from external TTPs. However, it becomes a
harder problem as soon as a user has to trust any arbitrary external
authorities. In LoT, by localising the trust, a user is able to put trusting
things in his/her own domain, or some places that the user already has
stable connection with.
3. Countermeasures/Mechanisms: Unlike most security frameworks
that usually propose a static set of countermeasures, arguably, LoT em-
ploys a tool-kit, which contains several countermeasures for different con-
texts. I suggest three main examples that are used to target the threats
and contexts considered in this dissertation. Consider the unique prop-
erty of pervasive environments, namely, positive human context, that is,
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human users have clear intention about what they are doing. I reason
that it would be extremely efficient and effective, if the security frame-
work allows users to choose a suitable mechanism from a tool set with
respect to their own assumptions and the changing environments that
they are facing.
3.3 The Correct Strangers Problem
To understand the main threat concerned in this dissertation, let us look at
a more generic case first. In figure 3.2, a local player (let us say Carol) can
access some resources in her own domain in two ways. Carol may locate
herself inside her domain boundary. Or, she may locate outside of her own
domain (usually in another remote domain). This is OK for one single domain,
because a security manager is present to make sure all local users are clear
about the local policy. Unfortunately, it is a different story in the multiple
 Domain A 
Resources 
Carol
Carol
request
request
OK
a
b
Figure 3.2: Assume that Alice is the domain server for domain A. A local
player Carol can use a pre-defined userID, a password, or a shared key proof
to log in, and further access some resources in her own domain A.
domain case due to the lack of knowledge and reliable resources about other
domains. Thus, a domain’s server has no local knowledge of players from other
domains, as illustrated in figure 3.3. Users or domains are said to be strangers
if prior security knowledge (e.g. crypto-key information) or trust relationships
have not been established among them. Users are most likely to be strangers
if they are from remote (friendly or strange) domains. A common resolution
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 Domain A
Resources 
Domain B"Who is Bob??"
a stranger Request
Figure 3.3: Alice is again assumed to be the domain server for domain A. Bob
is from a different domain B. Since Bob is unknown to domain A, Alice will
regard Bob as a stranger. The request will be refused.
adapted from conventional environments is to lift a security system/protocol
implemented successfully in one domain to the multiple domain case. Two
techniques 3 have been typically deployed to solve this strangers problem when
communications involve different domains.
1. “Let you become one of us” approach. Alice treats Bob as a local user.
She gives Bob the local user’s privileges by setting up a new log-in ac-
count or assigning a role to him.
2. “Let you become my apprentice” approach. This is usually known as
the delegation scheme. Alice delegates some of her rights to Bob, and
authorises him to access some certain resources on her behalf but with
some necessary restrictions.
For accomplishing these approaches, a universal global trust infrastructure is
needed, as simply highlighted in figure 3.4. It is doubtful whether this can be
achieved in pervasive environments.
3The question about whether it is appropriate to do either is out of the scope of this
discussion here.
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Domain B
"Who is Bob??"
TTPs (e.g. Certificate Authorities)
: the direction 
  of trust
Figure 3.4: Triangle trust diagram
3.4 Localising the Trust Security Principle
Depending upon threats, different domains may have different assumptions.
Consequently, they will have different local security policies, and correspond-
ingly implement different security countermeasures. A foreign domain’s policy
is not always clear or available to local users. When the communication crosses
domain boundaries, it is not only hard but (we shall argue) also unnecessary
for a user from one domain to understand the precise security policy and mech-
anisms from other domains. As explained in section 2.3.2, trust is subjective,
context-dependent and non-monotonic. Hence, when a lot of conventional sys-
tems use the term trusted, most of them really mean trustworthy. A TTP, e.g.
the CA in a PKI system, is a typical example. However, trust is not trustwor-
thiness [25], trust is subjective4 but trustworthiness is a matter of objective
fact. In other words, doing things right is not the same as doing the right
thing. For example, a TTP may do things right (“trustworthiness”); however,
even when it is obvious that this is so (and unfortunately it usually is not), it is
still hard to convince every player that this is always a right thing to do in the
first place. This is because different players may have different assumptions,
probably because of their local domains’ security polities.
The problem of this confusion is,
• “How do I know that you are doing your job properly”. Users have no
4By subjective, I mean subject dependent or (in this dissertation’s context) domain
dependent.
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idea if TTPs do their jobs responsibly. Even TTPs make a decision re-
sponsibly, users still have doubts whether this decision is for the right
purpose or not, by the standard of their own domains. It is difficult for
users to verify the decision during the communication if external CAs
have not done their job properly by the standards of the local domain.
Inevitably, trust transitivity problem [16, 25], the uncontrolled imposi-
tion of trust (e.g. the unfair compulsion to fully trust arbitrary CAs),
surfaces. To rely upon foreign standards is a considerably irrelevant con-
cern in the pervasive context. The primary issue is that external CAs
have made a decision responsibly but unfortunately for a different pur-
pose. Users cannot know whether it is right or not for their purpose
from their viewpoint.
• “I do not consider A as a threat, because I trust A”. The notion of
trust is used here to rule out some threats. However, different users will
look at a system from different perspectives. A trust assumption that
is applied in one place cannot be passing freely over to all places in the
loop.
Thus, we need a different 5 security design principle to guide security policy
establishing trust for pervasive environments. This principle should be inde-
pendent of any long-term stable and fixed trust infrastructure. I intend to lay
to rest the assumption of relying upon external TTPs to achieve the users’
security goal when the communication crosses multiple domains.
In the real world, we are most likely willing to trust ourselves. A local
third party is also involved, mainly for efficiency reasons, e.g. buying tickets
from a local travel agency. As this third party is local, we can easily verify
their trustworthiness on a certain transaction. Similarly, a localising the trust
security policy is proposed here for security over multiple domains. In terms
5Different in the sense of changing the way of thinking on current security policies. The
policies themselves may be perfectly adequate in some cases.
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of localising the trust for users, I specifically mean that the trust decision for a
particular security purpose should be coming from users’ own domains. This
trust decision can certainly be delegated to some others users (from the same
domain or from different domains) in different forms at some point. However,
it has to be rooted from users themselves. We do not like external TTPs to
make any final commit/abort decision for us. If we have to trust, we would
rather trust a local authority’s decision making or someone to whom we have
freely chosen to delegate.
In the multiple domain context, it is difficult to pre-know the pervasive in-
teractions that are going to occur. Hence, purely key-oriented or role-oriented
security approaches will not work very well. A domain-oriented scheme is sug-
gested here. As a matter of principle, a cross-domain security protocol should
not force users to explicitly know precise semantics of security mechanisms
in remote/foreign domains. Conversely, it ought to encourage each domain
to be responsible for its own domain’s security, further clearing up their own
mess if necessary (as described in the transcript discussion for [39]). The ob-
jective of localising the trust security policy is a logical consequence of this
understanding, particularly applied in the context of pervasive environments.
In figure 3.5, a user A and a user B are in different domains. The data
flow will go through the user A, the user B, domain B’s server and domain
A’s server. The domain is not just limited to a company, an organisation, a
university or a department, which administrates many attached end-users. A
user can also be regarded as a domain, particularly in the pervasive context.
Furthermore, he/she can set up several domains according to the context of
applications. More explicitly, for e-business applications, we can think of
domain A server as a main e-business server (e.g. “www.amazon.co.uk”) and
User A as some image servers that are dealing with current purchase requests;
domain B server can be some applications software running at users’ home
desktop and User B is more likely an agent, e.g. some trusted applications
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Domain A’s Server Domain B’s Server
User A User B
Domain A Domain B
Figure 3.5: Trust over multiple domains
running at a PDA or laptop carried around. For the bank system, domain
A server can be regarded as main bank servers and User A is existing bank
client terminals (e.g. ATMs or credit card readers), domain B server and User
B, still, can be home desktop and PDA respectively.
3.5 Security Countermeasures/Mechanisms
After identifying the threat and policy, a security tool-kit is deployed in the
LoT framework. As explained above, I investigate the security issue in the
multiple domain context from two ends, authentication and authorisation. As
a consequence, LoT provides some example security mechanisms.
Authentication: authentication is also referred to as the bootstrapping of
trust. It is traditionally a fundamental building block for security, support-
ing other security properties (e.g. confidentiality, integrity and availability)
[119]. For most pervasive applications, there is usually no prior knowledge
between pervasive users because they are most likely from different domains.
In addition, another challenging difficulty to bootstrap trust here is the un-
known environment. Numbers of hostile devices and other people may move
around in the same environment where some pervasive interactions take place.
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Therefore we need to be able to authenticate each other spontaneously (but
not based upon our IDs) without a fixed trust infrastructure. Two channel
authentication protocol is a quite straightforward example to achieve this, as
it mimics the positive human context in the real world. The protocol takes
advantage of the fact that it is easy to establish a low bandwidth but high data
origin authenticity channel when participants are all in the vicinity 6. Also, it
explicitly demonstrates that mobility can somehow be useful to leverage the
security [22] if we know what we are doing.
Authorisation: Authorisation is a significant method to establish trust,
or achieving access control. Most resources or services in pervasive environ-
ments are provided by many different organisations and human users, even
in one physical environment. Hence, it is infeasible to know which kind of
access rights are required to access those resources in advance. In addition,
pervasive environments require a flexible access control mechanism that does
not rely upon the same centralised infrastructure fixed for each domain. In-
stead of the conventional identity-oriented [65], key-oriented [10] or role-based
[106] approaches, a domain-oriented encryption-based access control (EBAC)
is introduced by the LoT framework (see chapter 5). This primarily targets
two typical scenarios when the access is over multiple domains.
1. Firstly, I will consider a scenario that two domains have established a
trust relationship in some ways, or we can describe them as “friendly”
domains. That is, domain B may be already known to domain A. For
instance, the partners company A/company B are working on a joint-
project. But nevertheless, a new assigned team member, Bob from Com-
pany B, would be a stranger to any team members from company A.
2. The second scenario is based upon the assumption that two domains
6Some applications may require further knowledge to establish the policy to determine
whether it is appropriate to share a key with a device nearby. This is actually achieved by
the authorisation end in LoT.
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have not established any trust relationship or shared crypto-knowledge
before (see section 6.5). However, a player needs to access some resources
on a purely temporary basis, such as, a guest who would like to access
some resources in the host’s house. The guest has to be introduced to
those resources by the host in order to access them. Thus, the user is
“friendly” in spite of the fact that he/she is from a stranger domain.
Consider a simple multiple domain case, a player Bob from domain B
wishes to access some resources in a remote domain A. Hence, Bob tries to
get access permission from Alice (we can consider Alice as domain A’s server).
For most conventional approaches, for instance, Kerberos, Bob has to get a
ticket from his own domain server before the interaction. Then, he submits
this ticket to Alice. If Alice recognises Bob’s ticket, she checks the access rights
associated with the ticket to determine if Bob has the correct rights to access
(compared with his access request). If so, Alice grants Bob’s access request.
Otherwise, Bob’s access will be refused.
For LoT’s EBAC, briefly speaking, Bob also needs to submit a form of
credential to Alice. However, this credential is not used for Alice to make a final
access decision. Instead, it contains sufficient (but just enough) information to
tell Alice which domain Bob is from. This is achieved by a Profile Certificate.
Bob submits his profile certificate to Alice during the interaction. Alice checks
whether Bob’s domain already has permission to access those resources. If
so, Alice gives Bob an encrypted token which can be converted to a useful
access capability only by the correct domain. Dual capabilities are being used
to complete this conversion. Most importantly, Bob can only decrypt this
token by authenticating himself to his own domain in accordance with his own
domain’s policy. If domain B is willing to delegate Bob that access, domain
B’s server will help Bob to decrypt the token. If domain B does not want
Bob to access those resources in domain A, Bob cannot decrypt the token.
Thus, Bob’s access is granted only if the token issued by Alice is converted by
68
Bob’s domain to a useful access information. As well as being authenticated
by his own domain, Bob must also prove to Alice that he is in control of the
hardware to which Alice has given the token. This process is described as
domain-oriented Encryption-based access control.
Note that the discussion above is only conceptual. Specific mechanisms
and protocols to achieve the required anti-properties (i.e. to guard against the
threat) will be described in the remaining chapters. I am not claiming that
those security countermeasures and mechanisms are ideal. Although novel,
they are intended primarily as an existence proof. Other mechanisms may be
better depending upon the precise application and context.
3.6 Conclusions
The LoT framework is a security infrastructure targeting the major concern of
talking to correct strangers in the multiple domain context. It is based upon
the concept of localising the trust. In LoT’s world, every player is affiliated
with its local domains. More significantly, domain security services/servers
are urged to participate in local players’ communications. LoT is designed
to question the security issues in the multiple domain context from two ends,
authentication and authorisation, and re-examine them in the light of the
paradigm shift for security in multiple domains, i.e. pervasive environments.
Thus, I will examine the authentication end first in the next chapter. I will
show the reason why a conventional meaning of authentication, i.e. ID-based
authentication, is not what we want in pervasive environment, and propose a
new two-channel protocol for authenticating strangers in LoT.
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Chapter 4
Spontaneous Authentication for
Pervasive Environments
Authentication is traditionally the fundamental building block to support
other security properties. It is conventionally required to involve some form
of proof of identity directly or indirectly. However, such strong (ID-based)
authentication targets the wrong security requirements for pervasive environ-
ments, when humans are admitted into the loop.
Thus in this chapter, I focus upon the classical authentication problem,
and argue that the desirable contextual information for different pervasive
applications can be exploited to replace unnecessary strong (ID-based) au-
thentication. First, I outline the basic security requirements for talking to
correct strangers in the authentication context. Secondly, I consider how to
positively re-frame the significant human context as a desirable security ser-
vice for pervasive environments. Then, a two-channel authentication scheme
involving using two-level protocols and human interactions is proposed. Fi-
nally, I describe two approaches from the DH-S3P protocol to address the
public meeting threat model.
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4.1 Basic Security Requirements in Pervasive
Environments
The paradigm of pervasive computing [128, 129] introduces a new vision of
an environment where users can communicate with resources regardless of the
limitations of time and space. Human users are in the centre of this envi-
ronment and are surrounded by numerous computing-capable devices. Those
devices are embedded in daily objects of the environment, such as, Personal
Digital Assistants (PDAs), cars, refrigerators, clothes, pens, etc., seamlessly
pervading all parts of everyday life. They interact with each other spon-
taneously and (highly) dynamically, following human intension but without
human awareness.
4.1.1 Talking to Correct Strangers
Authentication is originally introduced to guarantee that the communicating
users are who they claim to be [19, 82, 93], implicitly or explicitly. It involves
some form of identity directly or indirectly in most cases, as illustrated in
2.1.1. In conventional environments, the semantics of the human interactions
that it supports have been largely ignored. Conventional ID-based authenti-
cation is always required to be strong enough to distinguish legitimate users
from unauthorised users as a result. This is achieved mostly by relying upon
challenge-response identification or interactive proofs involving TTPs. How-
ever, strong (ID-based) authentication is an inefficient, heavyweight task. It
largely requires standardised infrastructures. As a result, to achieve strong
(ID-based) authentication is hard.
We have seen a number of costly scenarios and systems being designed
to authenticate communicating participants’ identities, either universal names
or logical identities. These aim to secure the association between legitimate
users’ identities and their resources. This kind of association attempts to
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secure the entire communication from very beginning but is always subject to
threats, such as ID-theft and spoofing. Generally, Bob masquerades as Alice
not because Bob really fancies being Alice. Bob is rather interested in the
resources or access rights associated with Alice’s identity. Thus, my belief is
that involvement of heavyweight identity-based authentication into protocols
does not make them as secure as initially expected. Instead, such an approach
opens attacks unnecessarily on identities in addition to incurring expensive
costs.
An obvious cause of the difficulty to secure a pervasive environment is the
spontaneous interactions between devices that meet for the first time in an ad-
hoc manner. Very often, those devices are strangers to each other. In other
words, they have not established any previous security association or crypto
knowledge. They may not share a fresh secret key, or the corresponding public
keys are unknown to each other, for instance. Arguably, traditional public key
certificates could be implemented here. But this demands an accessible path
to TTPs whensoever the protocol needs, not just to obtain the corresponding
participants’ certificates, but also to cope with more serious certificate revoca-
tion circumstances. Moreover, the communicating participants are most likely
coming from different domains. Even if the recognition of certificates crossing
domains is solved by chained negotiation among TTPs, there is no guarantee
that the success of security policy checking in one domain will be propagated
to other domains. It is increasingly frustrating for them to understand each
other’s security policy and further adopting the appropriate security mecha-
nism. The unfair Trust Transitivity problem [16, 25] also indicates that the
traditional pre-issued certificate-like authentication approaches have their own
weaknesses for dynamic pervasive environments.
Thus, the security requirement in pervasive environments differs from the
one addressed by conventional strong (ID-based) authentication schemes. Those
72
schemes deliver subtly the wrong security requirement for pervasive environ-
ments. The primary objective for pervasive users is not to find out the identity
of another communicating participant to whom they are talking, “are they re-
ally who they claim to be”. Instead, they intend to learn or validate whether
the communicating participants have certain desirable contextual information
for the particular interaction. Consider an example that Alice is going to print
a document residing in her PDA to a printer nearby. She does not really care
what the nearby printer’s name is. The essential concern in terms of the au-
thentication is if the document is sent from Alice’s PDA to the printer she is
looking at 1. Here, nearby is the contextual information for the printing job
required by Alice, “I do not care who you are, but I do care you are the one
just next to me” 2. Alice does not want her private document sent to any
other printers in the same room, or worse, further away, without her notice,
as the result of intentional attacks or unintentional misconfiguration.
I am motivated by the context of talking to correct strangers in pervasive
environments from the beginning of this research. A typical example applica-
tion is given below in this chapter. It is important to pinpoint that the name
or ID of the user (e.g. a person, a device or a process) is meaningless as far
as this form of authentication is concerned.
4.1.2 Motivating Threat Model - Public Meeting 1
Company A and company B are doing a joint business project together. Al-
ice and Bob are the marketing managers for company A and B respectively.
They meet each other for the first time in a public conference room, which
contains many other people with many computer devices. Alice wishes to send
1It is assumed that Alice trusts this nearby printer will not pass the document to other
printers or devices, perhaps because she sees a particular manufacturer’s tamper-evident
seal on the printer.
2Again, we should also take the “local” security policy into consideration, particularly if
Alice and the printer are in the same domain. For example, the local security policy may
restrict Alice to print sensitive document only on authorised printers.
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a private project plan document m to Bob in some wireless way, for instance,
the mobile ad-hoc communication established between their personal devices
DRDalice and DRDbob. In this dissertation, DRDx, as Digital Representative
Devices, refers to a personal computer device with wireless communications
capability and reasonable computational resources for a human user x. Notice
that, for the purpose of spontaneous authentication, I assume that Bob is the
person who Alice has already known to be the correct stranger in this example.
Thus, the correct stranger here explicitly means their personal devices have
not established any secure association before. A more complex scenario will
be discussed in the next chapter.
A major security concern in this case is numbers of hostile devices and
other people moving around in the same conference room. Alice does not want
the private document sent to another device called DRDbob (intentionally or
unintentionally) held by someone else in this room, instead of by Bob who is
standing next to her. Thus, the main threat here is whether the document
is sent from the DRDalice held by Alice to the DRDbob held by Bob who is
standing next to Alice.
Notice that DRDalice and DRDbob have not set up a security association
before this public meeting. It is well understood that the wireless communi-
cation channel is vulnerable to both passive attacks and active attacks. An
attacker within a wireless radio range can easily eavesdrop or modify the doc-
ument. Furthermore, the attacker can even masquerade as Alice (precisely
DRDalice) or do a man in the middle attack. Another threat in the public
meeting model is that the document transmitted between the DRDalice and
DRDbob can be overheard and possibly modified.
Alice and Bob might intuitively choose an arbitrarily reasonably long value3
as a shared key phrase to encrypt the transmitted document. This only works
if the surrounding area is guaranteed to be secure, e.g. in a locked private
3It should be long enough to be invulnerable to exhaustive search.
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meeting room, in a Faraday cage. Otherwise, for circumstances like the public
conference room, an attacker Moriarty can easily obtain the key by either
peeking over shoulder or a hidden CCTV, enabling him to violate the secure
communication between Alice and Bob’s devices. This is similar to what we
have experienced in the current Chip & PIN credit card approach deployed in
the UK.
Consequently, the ultimate security goal is to establish a spontaneous se-
cure communication between DRDs being held by Alice and Bob, who are
standing next to each other, respectively. I will give my approaches in 4.3.
4.2 Significant Human Context in Pervasive
Environments
Nowadays, pervasive environments are characterised by the achievement of
computer-invisibility, people communicating by means of the presence of phys-
ical visible devices but without noticing their existence. It is very clear that the
human context is the distinctive property for pervasive environments. Explic-
itly, it is desirable to transform security techniques into the new human-based
philosophy for pervasive environments.
4.2.1 Positive Human Context
Among the more serious threats which make cryptosystems fail in the real
world are human implementation errors and management failures [3]. Superfi-
cially, limiting human influences on computing systems is usually a basic disci-
pline to guide security protocols design, especially for authentication protocols
in conventional environments. This is considered reasonable because of hu-
man unpredictability, including dishonest or incompetent behaviours. Hence,
we always worry that the involvement of human context would mess up the
security dramatically as many cases witnessed in Mitnick’s book [87]. Humans
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are invisible in conventional communication contexts such as Internet-based
computing. Computer devices follow human instructions, but ignore whether
these instructions are appropriate to the tasks or come from the right human.
Thus, strong (ID-based) authentication is always required to ensure that a
tracing step can be followed if something is going wrong.
Michael Roe in his Ph.D thesis [103] shows that what is regarded as a
security threat in one context may become a mechanism providing a desired
security service in a different context. We have to look at the context to decide
whether something is a threat or a security service. Human influences are usu-
ally negatively considered as threats. But nevertheless, the communications
in pervasive environments always occur in a highly dynamic and spontaneous
way. This results in the infeasibility to have proper pre-computational re-
sources configured for a particular interaction. For those interactions between
human and human, human and devices, only the human has the contextual
knowledge about the forthcoming interactions. For instance, we often have
pre-decision (“This is the one to whom I am willing to talk”), and physico-
spatial knowledge (“Yes, I can see this is the one I am going to talk to”) for
pervasive applications. Thus, the human context cannot be simply considered
as a threat because it is the distinctive property for pervasive environments.
I shall attempt to positively re-frame knowledgeable human influence as a de-
sirable security mechanism in the pervasive context. On the one hand, human
users will not worry about the details of pervasive interactions. On the other
hand, they ought to be encouraged to interact with the devices and environ-
ments more positively, leveraging the ultimate security goal.
Thus, in a similar manner to Roe’s threat/service duality, I argue that
the positive human context is the distinctive security service for pervasive
environments. Conversely, failing to recognise the positive human context is
a threat in the pervasive context.
76
4.2.2 Minimise The Reliance Upon Trustworthiness
A maltrust problem is defined if humans abuse trust gained from other hu-
mans. Most conventional schemes are built upon computed credentials 4 from
computing devices, intending to solve the maltrust problem. A typical example
in the real world is the current Chip and PIN credit card approach. It intends
to shift the final jurisdiction from human verification (signature recognition)
to computed authentication (system verifying PIN matching). These schemes,
however, have not achieved better security performance because the essential
maltrust problem has not been solved as it was expected to be. Instead, it is
simply reproduced from the human-human domain to the human-device do-
main. Consequently, increasing human reliance upon computer devices with
the seamless interactions between humans and devices in pervasive environ-
ments is in fact compounding the problems caused by maltrust.
The principle of my proposal is based on a Need-to-Know policy 5. This
policy is not new, and was originally produced in a military context and clas-
sically applied in access control systems via minimising access rights. Note
that in this approach it is critical to relate authentication explicitly to access
control, because the primary purpose of authentication in a Need-to-Know con-
text is precisely to determine (minimal) access rights. Here, we transfer this
idea to authentication protocols and introduce a minimise the reliance upon
trustworthiness principle to balance trust coming from human and computer
device domains.
For DRDs, it is a high-cost and complicated job to deal with unpredictable
confusions by depending only on computational results. Likewise, each DRD
cannot simply be assumed honest, competent, and willing to perform expensive
4Computed credentials are bit-pattern which are solely calculated by computing algo-
rithm behind the scene.
5Regardless of how freely we wish to make resources available, it is dangerous (from the
integrity and audit dimensions of security) for users to hold capabilities which they do not
even intend to use, as explained in the principle of least privilege [40, 105]
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tasks strictly. So it is unfair to establish trustworthiness from authorities’
assurances (due to an obvious trust transitivity problem) and it is worse to rely
entirely on the results of computations performed by computer devices with
no human interaction (another expression of trust transitivity). For instance,
when customers withdraw money from an ATM, they cannot ensure (or even
verify) that the ATM will implement security policy checking correctly (but
interestingly, both banks and customers usually assume ATMs will do so).
As I pointed out above, positive human involvement is necessary to the
security of pervasive computing. Introducing human context into security
protocols has the potential to guide pervasive computer devices to deal with
complex security requirements effectively. I have always been inspired by a
comment of Mark Weiser, the father of ubiquitous computing, in his well-
known paper [128]:
“There is more information available at our fingertips during a
walk in the woods than in any computer system, yet people find
a walk among trees relaxing and computers frustrating. Machines
that fit the human environment, instead of forcing humans to enter
theirs, will make using a computer as refreshing as taking a walk
in the woods.”
4.3 Two Channel Authentication Protocols
4.3.1 Leave Strong Authentication Behind
Strong (ID-based) authentication does not do us any favours when we attempt
to secure pervasive environments. It is hard, introduces unnecessary attacks,
and more significantly, it is not what we want to solve the problem, as ex-
plained in 4.1.1. Hence, I intend to ask a logical question, “why not just
break the association between identities and authorised resources or access
rights?” In other words, “Strong authentication is not always necessary in all
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circumstances”. Breaking this link can enable us to achieve:
• Privacy and Identity Protection: one desirable consequence is that a
raw identity will not be valuable any more so that ID-theft or spoofing
makes no sense at all. Hence, it protects identity indirectly. Moreover,
excluding identity information in the protocols will satisfy human privacy
requirements.
• Data Uncorrelation: another exciting gain is to erase correlation among
all input/output data streams with respect to entities. Such uncorrela-
tion makes many active attacks more difficult.
Some may disagree, and argue that unacceptable risks arise by dropping strong
(ID-based) authentication from protocols, particularly in the sense of talking
to strangers in pervasive computing 6. It is indeed risky to talk to strangers;
however, such risks do not arise from whether protocols are equipped with
strong authentication or not. Instead, these risks are coming from the re-
quirements of the applications themselves, i.e. talking to strangers. A similar
philosophy applies in human daily life. If Alice trusts Bob whom she has
not met or trusted before, then Alice has to risk the possible consequences.
Protocols without strong authentication will not necessarily weaken security
performance compared with the ones which have. Conversely, they can elimi-
nate the threats accompanied with unnecessary strong authentication.
4.3.2 Spontaneous Authentication with Two Channels
Protocol
Despite the feasibility of leaving conventional strong authentication behind
in pervasive environments, distinguishing legitimate users from unauthorised
6Another likely concern is how to provide an audit trail without requiring communicating
parties’ identities as part of authentication protocols. Although a discussion on audit trails
is out of the scope of this dissertation, I also briefly highlight a possible way to support an
audit trail in the LoT framework (see the footnote 3 on 107).
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users is still an issue. Here, I propose my mechanism Spontaneous Authentica-
tion or human thinkable authentication 7. Thinking is a distinctive ability in
human behaviours, which is unlikely to be exhibited by any computational de-
vice8. The spontaneous “thinkable” authentication protocols with the human
self-determination contrast with the traditional “computable” authentication
protocols which involve no distinctively human agency.
In order to achieve this goal, it is expected to impose necessary tolerances
to executed protocols. There is no entirely transparent trust in most cases for
pervasive applications. Transparent trust in this dissertation means that two
entities have established a trust relationship before (e.g. share a secret key) or
have been introduced by knowledgeable authorities (e.g. holding correspond-
ing certificates). The tolerance property should be understood differently de-
pending upon applications. For instance in pervasive environments, the basic
wireless RF channel does not have high data origin authenticity. Instead of
expending too much cost on making an RF channel with that characteristic,
it is desirable to make the protocols tolerant of this limitation. More pre-
cisely, another out of band channel is assumed with the required characteristic
(high data origin authenticity in this case). Semantically, such an out of band
channel is quite similar to a location-limited [13], or empirical [33] channel.
It is a relatively low bandwidth channel compared with high bandwidth RF
channel. It is subject to passive attack but not to active attack. Therefore,
the ad-hoc communication participants can be assured that the data on this
channel does really come from their counterparts. It could be realised in many
ways between human-human and human-device, for instance, physical contact
between the devices, a close range infra-red link, or one device displaying a
number on the screen which is typed into another device by the human user,
7Consider the human thinking ability, this is to put human in the authentication loop.
8The possibility of devices which can pass the Turing test [125] is beyond the scope of
this dissertation, but arguably such devices should be regarded as human users rather than
as DRDs from the cyber rights perspective.
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and so on. Essentially, the human context (e.g. hearing, monitoring) is re-
quired at this level. We call these human contexts human self-determination.
Knowledge is said to be human self-determination if the knowledge is acquired
via necessary human contexts, such as, hearing a tune or seeing a display.
Thus, two levels of security mechanism are introduced to incorporate hu-
man self-determination knowledge into authentication protocols due to the
existence of two channels. It allows tradeoff between trustworthiness in both
sectors (human-human and human-device).
1. A Plausible (but unreliable) trust (or PT) protocol is used in the high
bandwidth channel with the necessary security tolerances. The RF chan-
nel is subject to both passive attacks and active attacks. Thus, tolerances
here explicitly means that the main purpose of this protocol is to stop
passive attacks. Trust gained from the PT protocol run is plausible, but
not reliable for active attacks which occur in the high bandwidth RF
channel. I will give an example to explain what I mean by this form of
trust in 4.4.1 below.
2. A Reliable trust (acquired through human self-determination) (or RT)
protocol is called to achieve higher levels of assurance (e.g. high data
origin authenticity) with the assistance of the out-of-band channel. This
comes with the mandatory interaction of human context, e.g. moni-
toring, hearing, recording, etc., depending upon the choice of out-of-
band channel. This is expected to gain an equivalent outcome to that
which strong authentication schemes achieve in conventional environ-
ments. The protocol’s run is completed as success of a human trust-based
decision process [77].
These two protocols work together to support the Spontaneous Authentica-
tion with two channel protocol argument. Some existing protocols (some of
them are listed in section 2) can be substantially adapted to the Spontaneous
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Authentication hypothesis, e.g. physical contact authentication in Stajano’s
Resurrecting Duckling [120, 121, 13], entity recognition module [112], authen-
tication starting from weak secret agreement protocols and applications, and
other contextual attributes (i.e. time, temperature, services, locations, specific
transactions) stated in [32].
After implementing the PT and RT protocol, eventually, the human users
must further be assumed that a fresh session key has been shared between the
correct ad-hoc devices. More significantly, no other device or person can know
this session key.
4.4 Example Protocols
The Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange protocol [41] is the classic solution
to the key agreement problem in a decentralised environment. However, the
traditional DH key exchange protocol relies upon the assurance of integrity
in the high bandwidth message exchange channel. Such an assumption can
barely be achieved in the pervasive context when the wireless RF channel is
deployed. Correspondingly, a prior context (e.g. a password or a nonce) has
been involved in many protocols [8, 9, 28, 50], mainly targeting the man-in-the-
middle attack. It is still a problem for most pervasive applications, for instance,
the public meeting threat model (in the 4.1.2) which I am investigating in this
chapter. The prior context exchanged between Alice and Bob, or their hand-
held devices, is vulnerable in an open (even hostile) environment (e.g. the
public conference room). Anyone who successfully obtains the prior context
can break the entire authentication protocol.
I will give two approaches built upon a basic DH-S3P protocol [28]. They
require both significant human context and two channel authentication to
address the problem. Consider the public meeting scenario, assume that,
DRDalice, DRDbob: two private DRDs held by Alice and Bob respectively,
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which have monitor screens (e.g. PDA) and sufficient computational resources;
a, b: random numbers generated by DRDalice, DRDbob respectively. They
have to be strong enough to be the discrete logarithm (DL) exponent.
Also, we assume generator g, large prime modulus q = 2p + 1 for prime
p, and one-way hash function h are publicly known. Random numbers a and
b generated by DRDs must be strong (i.e. long enough to be invulnerable to
exhaustive search) as well as hard to predict. A full discussion of assumptions
as preconditions not specific to the mobile ad-hoc context is given in [28].
4.4.1 Basic Approach
The first basic approach is based upon our early work [78]. We assume that
Alice and Bob agree a shared weak secret k in the meeting. It may, for instance,
be a password which might be reasonably short. Alice could choose a value of
k and secretly tell Bob before the following processes take place.
• Setup Phase in PT protocol:
1. Alice initiates request by inputting k into DRDalice, generating a
random number a and demanding DRDalice to set up mobile ad-
hoc communication with DRDbob,
DRDalice → DRDbob: XA
where, XA = g
a + k mod q.
2. Bob inputs the same k which he obtains from Alice, into DRDbob.
DRDbob generates random number b and responds,
DRDbob → DRDalice: YB
where, YB = g
b + k mod q.
• Marking Phase in RT protocol:
After the setup phase, neither Alice nor Bob has sufficient knowledge to
determine whether messages are coming from a genuine device or from
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malicious ones.
However, DRDalice and DRDbob both generate,
g2ab mod q = (s|n),
where, s is a session key and n is a nonce (with reasonable length)
Then, both devices calculate,
n1 = h{n}
and show n1 on the screens in some graphic form
9. Here, I use a slightly
different message exchange sequence from the one described in [28].
Now, note that in addition to the RF channel, a human visual checking
channel is deployed as an out of band channel in this phase. Thus, Alice
and Bob have to check the hash images displayed on both DRDalice
and DRDbob’s screens. Mutual authentication is eventually completed
only by Alice and Bob observing matching hash images. By then, Alice
agrees to send m encrypted under the session s which is only known by
DRDbob. Both of them will abort the interaction otherwise, if the hash
images are not matching.
Developing positive human context into an authentication protocol allows
weak confidentiality to be boosted into strong confidentiality, which is pro-
vided by subsequent session key use. In contrast with the original DH-S3P
protocol, the security of this approach only partially depends on the continuing
secrecy of the shared password k.
Admittedly, it is very difficult to guarantee that no human nearby Alice
and Bob will peek at the process in order to get password k. An attacker
Moriarty may obtain the weak secret k. He would, however, need to get
9Perhaps similar to those used in CAPTCHA [126, 127]. Such graphics are sufficiently
easy for humans to distinguish, but hard for computer devices to spoof, to replace hash
function bit-values.
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k early enough (before the message 1) in order to perform the man-in-the-
middle attack. Note that the final hash value n1 used for human verification
is essentially truncated from the h{g2ab}. Hence, if the bit length of n1 is too
short (say 16 bits only), Moriarty (his personal device DRDM) can actively
intercept the wireless communication (as shown in [50]),
1. Moriarty replaces the message 1 with ga
′
+ k mod q, for some random
value a′ chosen by himself.
DRDalice → DRDM : g
a + k mod q,
DRDM → DRDbob: g
a′ + k mod q,
2. Bob generates his DH value (gb) and sends,
DRDbob → DRDM : g
b + k mod q,
At this point, Bob computes g2a
′b mod q = (s|n) and hashes the last 16
bits (n′1 = h{n}) as the image;
3. Moriary computes the X ′ = g2a
′b mod q as well. Then, he chooses a
set of random values b′. For each b′, he computes the Y ′ = g2ab
′
mod q
and compares the last 16-bit of h{X ′} and h{Y ′} until the matching is
found. Moriarty sends this particular b′ to Alice,
DRDM → DRDalice: g
b′ + k mod q,
4. Alice computes g2ab
′
mod q = (s′|n) and hashes the last 16 bits (n′1 =
h{n}).
5. Finally, Alice and Bob will find the matching images displayed in the
screens although they do not share a session key. Moriarty will get the
m when Alice encrypts the message with the key s (the head of X ′),
which is in fact shared with Moriarty. Bob encrypts any message with
s′ (the head of Y ′) which is also shared with Moriarty. It is feasible to
do so in a short time if the attacker has significant (pre-)computational
resources.
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Thus, the bit value of n needs to be long enough (at least 48 bits according to
[50]).
However, this approach requires the attacker to engage in the protocol early
enough. If the attacker only gets the k after the messages 1 and 2 transmission
between A and B. The attacker cannot get the value of g2ab, because he cannot
solve the DL problem. Thus, devices which behave as “man-in-the-middle”
still cannot know the private message m. Even if, Moriarty obtains one of
the DL exponents (namely, a or b) as well somehow, which means he might
be able to re-produce the hash image. However, the k is used to calculate
the decryption key for the message decipher. In other words, the k is used to
calculate subsequent protocol values. Moriarty has to commit this exponent
value before he learns the k. Hence, it would be too late for Moriarty to
interfere with the communication between Alice and Bob. One possibility
to attack this approach is to repeat the message (1) and send it to DRDbob,
particularly when Alice and Bob would like to exchange another company plan
m2 (after a short period) but from DRDbob to DRDalice. To block such a replay
attack, necessary freshness can be provided using a nonce. More significantly,
this change addresses the man-in-the-middle attack for the short truncated
hash value described above. This will be examined in the next approach.
4.4.2 Generic Approach with two Channel Protocol
I will show a generic approach using nonces. We assume that, na and nb are
the nonces generated by DRDalice and DRDbob respectively. It is assumed
that both nonces are generated by the crypto-modules inside the devices. The
attacker cannot see what it is going on inside the crypto-modules even if
spyware is running inside the DRDs. Thus, those nonces are invisible to the
attacker when the interaction occurs.
Two physically different channels are used in this approach. The notation,
X →C Y : Z represents the data Z is transmitted from X to Y in the
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channel C.
In the public meeting model, two channels, one of which is RF channel and
the other is an out-of-band channel (OoB), an infrared link for instance, are
deployed.
1. DRDalice generates a random number a and a weak nonce na, setting up
mobile ad-hoc communication with DRDbob,
DRDalice →RF DRDbob: XA,
where, XA = g
a + na mod q,
2. DRDbob also generates a random number b and a weak nonce nb, re-
sponding with,
DRDbob →RF DRDalice: YB,
where, YB = g
b + nb mod q;
3. At this point, the second, out of band, channel (denoted OoB) is used,
DRDalice →OoB DRDbob: na,
DRDbob →OoB DRDalice: nb,
4. The final stage is similar to the one in the basic approach, using nec-
essary human self-determination. DRDalice and DRDbob both generate,
g2ab mod q = (s|n),
where s is a session key and n is a nonce. Both devices show the hash
images in the screens. Alice and Bob have to check if the hash images
are matching.
For the final stage, alternatively, we can assume that DRDalice and
DRDbob both compute, g
2ab mod q = (s|n1|n2),
where, s is still a session key. The nonce n1 and n2 generated from the
calculation (g2ab mod q) have the same constant bit-length (let us say 50
bits). Hence, instead of checking hash images, Alice and Bob are doing
the following step,
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• DRDalice →RF DRDbob: n1,
• DRDbob →RF DRDalice: n2,
Now, the crypto-modules inside the devices DRDalice and DRDbob check
whether the received value (n1 or n2 respectively) matches the one ob-
tained from (g2ab mod q). If both crypto-modules can find the match,
Alice will send the message encrypted under s. Otherwise, they an-
nounce an error 10.
The attacker Moriarty cannot influence na and nb during the communica-
tion. As explained previously, the OoB channel is subject to passive attacks
but not for active attacks. It is possible for the attacker Moriarty to learn
na and nb but only after step 3. In other words, it is too late for Moriarty
to attack truncated values, even he has sufficient pre-computation resources.
Hence, the man-in-the-middle attack is infeasible. Moreover, na and nb are
revealed via the out-of-band channel after the stranger devices are committed
to the messages transmitted over the RF channel. This approach is similar
to some authentication protocols (for mobile ad-hoc or pervasive computing)
introduced in chapter 2. However there is a major difference in terms of the
security semantics. In this two channel approach, the messages transmitted
via the second channel are required to calculate subsequent security values,
rather than simply to do equality verification. Hence, a lazy or unauthenti-
cated player will not cause a security breach.
Both approaches enhance the conventional DH key exchange protocol, par-
ticularly for the purpose of talking to the correct strangers in pervasive en-
vironments. Essentially in both approaches, the conventional DH protocol
consists of the first two messages (with k or na, nb set to zero). The signifi-
cant human context is introduced to complete the authentication process for
pervasive environments.
10This alternative step was suggested during a discussion with Prof. Bruce Christianson.
For detail refer to the paper [26].
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4.5 Conclusions
The protocols in this chapter highlights the usefulness of exploiting contextual
information in pervasive environments instead of replying upon conventional
strong (ID-based) authentication scenarios. The concept of utilising out of
band channels can promote significant human context to pervasive environ-
ments. This approach is spontaneous and independent of the infrastructure.
Moreover, it implies an efficient solution to the puzzle of talking to the cor-
rect strangers for most pervasive applications. But what authentication has
to achieve depends upon what can go wrong.
For the threat model targeted in this chapter, human users Alice and Bob
are assumed to be known to each other as the correct strangers already. The
main concern is the spontaneous authentication between devices held by the
human users. In the next chapter, I will relax this assumption and investigate
the security requirements under the absence of human trust (e.g. Alice and
Bob do not know each other). Correspondingly, I will explicitly relate this
problem to the classical access control scenario because the major purpose of
authentication is to determine (minimal) access rights.
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Chapter 5
The Domain-Oriented Approach
for Access Control Over
Multiple Domains
The most important aspect of the LoT framework is the authorisation end.
The concept of achieving access control in the multiple domain context is
syntactically similar to the one witnessed in conventional environments. Se-
mantically, however, access control over multiple domains is different because
it requires an effective approach that does not rely upon the same fixed trust
infrastructure for each domain. The conventional approach to this problem
is to introduce a globally trusted TTPs. However, I wish to encourage local
domains to take part in their users’ interactions as a result of the localising
the trust security policy. Thus, I propose a domain-oriented encryption-based
access control scheme in this chapter. This scheme is the basic foundation
underpinning the LoT access control mechanism.
This chapter is focused on an architectural description and some associated
issues (i.e. delegation, revocation) for encryption-based access control (EBAC)
in the multiple domain context. It provides a conceptual basis for the following
chapter. This chapter begins with the highlight of the advantage of developing
a domain-oriented viewpoint for access control in the multiple domain context.
Section 5.2 describes a new form of certificate, Profile Certificate, which is used
90
only for conveying information between users and their associated domains,
but not for making a final commit/abort decision for users. When a user from
one domain attempts to access some resources in other domains, delegation
and localised authentication will occur to achieve authorisation. This will
be analysed in Section 5.3. Section 5.4 presents the architecture of EBAC
constructed in a novel way. This chapter ends with a discussion on some key
features of achieving revocation in the EBAC scheme.
5.1 Domain-Oriented Access Control Method
5.1.1 Access Control over Multiple Domains
The trust establishment problem is a derived form of the classic Access Control
problem [62]. This can be seen from the simplest example, “can Server S allow
User U performing operation E on resource R”. From the resource server’s
(S) perspective, a typical solution to this problem involves two logical steps.
1. Step 1: Authenticating the user U . Conventionally, this step is achieved
via the verification of the user’s ID, cryption-key (i.e. public key), or
a role. These approaches are (very often) referred to the ID-oriented,
Key-oriented or Role-oriented methods for access control. Inevitably,
the association between a user and a crypto-key, the crypto-key and
access rights, a user and a role is guaranteed by the presence of TTPs,
because the user U may be “unknown” to the resource server S. This
idea can simply be illustrated as a triangle diagram in figure 5.1. The
resource server has to reply upon TTPs to make a security decision, in
order to achieve its own security goals.
It is fair to say that the resource server totally depends upon a fixed
trust infrastructure [44], such as CAs and directory servers, to make a
correct decision here. Relying upon TTPs to make a final commit/abort
security decision is sound and workable for one single domain because
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Server
TTPs (e.g. CAs)
: the direction 
of trust
Figure 5.1: Trust triangle
the local security policy and resources are clear to all entities.
However, pervasive interactions almost always involve users from many
possible different domains spontaneously. A foreign domain’s policy is
not always clear or available to all users. Therefore, it is difficult for
users to verify the access decision during communications if external
TTPs have not done their job consistently with the standards of the
local domain.
2. Step 2: Authorising the access request for U according to the access
control policy, if step 1 is completed.
Access control policies can be controlled by either external authorities
or resource servers themselves1. If external authorities manage access
control policies, they need to know if any access control policy change
occurred in the resource domain because they are unlikely to be resource
owners. However, this mandatory type of access control faces additional
challenges in any genuinely multiple domain context. It is problematic
to obtain those observations without the support from a global fixed
trust infrastructure in pervasive environments. Moreover, a pervasive
user might not know which kind of access right is needed to access a
certain resource. Most of all, imposed by the localising of trust security
1These scenarios are also known as Mandatory Access Control and Discretionary Access
Control [95, 107] respectively.
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design principle in this dissertation, access control policies ought to be
administrated by the resource owner. Unlike mandatory access control,
LoT does not have a central administrator to monitor the distribution
of access rights. The proper access rights will instead be delegated to
other users freely. I shall discuss delegation in detail in section 5.3
The syntax of the access control mechanism in LoT is similar to the one for
most conventional access control systems. I will still look at access control
in multiple domains from these two steps, authentication and authorisation.
However, due to the different requirement, specifically for the authentication
step, the semantics of achieving access control changes. Thus, for the autho-
risation end in LoT, I will pay more attention to step 1 in the access control
process and argue that the multiple domain context requires a more effective
way to achieve it.
5.1.2 Domain-Oriented Approach
Access requests across domain boundaries, i.e. pervasive environments, require
a flexible access control mechanism that is independent of a long-term stable
and fixed trust infrastructure [35, 45, 121]. As indicated in chapter 3, LoT’s
view of the world is domain-oriented. Explicitly, domains are responsible to
make the security decisions for their local users with respect to local policies.
For achieving access control over multiple domains, I argue that the user
should be essentially authenticated by his/her local domain, rather than being
authenticated by a remote resource server’s domain. To explain this, I develop
my argument by analysis of the three statements below.
As illustrated in figure 5.2, assume a Ph.D student, Bob, from university
B, intend to use the service S (e.g. fax machine, the Internet) in a public
conference centre.
1. Statement 1:
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Figure 5.2: Alice is the owner of the service S, and she will not let Bob access
S unless Bob proves he is a current Ph.D student from university B. We can
regard Alice as a resource domain and university B as a users domain for
instance.
Bob: “my name is Bob, a Ph.D student from University B.” handing
over the student card possibly;
Alice: “who is Bob? is this credential (i.e. the student card) from Bob
really belonging to you?”
2. Statement 2:
Bob: “This key K has the right proving I am a Ph.D student from
University B.” We also can substitute K with a capability (e.g. [55, 71]),
or a delegation token (e.g. [49, 118]).
Alice: “is K still valid? has it been revoked by university B already?”
3. Statement 3:
Bob: “I am a Ph.D student from University B, and I would like to access
the service S.”
Alice: “OK, this is a capability to access S, however, it is locked and
can only be unlocked by University B.”
Bob calls university B to get an appropriate ticket to unlock the access
capability by authenticating him to his own university as an valid Ph.D
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student.
For both statement 1 and 2, the association between the user Bob and its ID or
key is essentially defined by the authentication mechanism in University B. It is
frustrating for Alice to understand the precise semantics of the authentication
mechanisms used by University B. Thus, inevitably, external authorities have
to get involved here.
Statement 3 is different 2 as Alice does not care who Bob is, or what Bob’s
key is. The only thing she wants to know is whether university B considers
this access requester as a Ph.D student or not at this moment. For this
requirement, the administrative server from university B (rather than Alice
herself) is the most suitable place to make a decision. Hence, essentially, Bob
is required to authenticate himself to his own domain, university B. The term
authenticate is used here at a more generic level. This form of authentication
can be done by using either a classic user authentication-focused mechanism
or a more access control-focused tool.
To allow domains to authenticate their local users is more efficient than
implementing authentication across domains. Alice does not need to know the
precise semantics of security mechanisms, such as authentication, in University
B. In essence, the domain-oriented approach for access control in LoT intends
to reduce the difficult problem (access control over multiple domains) to two
considerably easier problems (user authentication in a single local domain and
remote authorisation between two domains) that we are more confident to deal
with.
This domain-oriented approach for access control is well suited for the
LoT’s world because it ties a user’s claim closely with his/her affiliated local do-
main. It follows the localising the trust policy by letting domains authenticate
2This approach may seem “unappealing” in practice. However, I intend to build up from
this simple statement to show the semantics of the domain-oriented approach for access
control over multiple domains.
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their local users if authentication is necessary. More significantly, it encourages
domains to get involved with their local users’ interactions. Hence, we need
to have a form of information showing which domain the user is from. The
association between a user and its domain is quite straightforward for an email
system. Interestingly, most Identity-based Encryption systems use the email
system to explain their semantics. A user’s email address clearly indicates the
association between a domain and a user, for instance, LJ@herts.ac.uk, which
contains the knowledge that “the user LJ is coming from domain herts.ac.uk”.
It is another issue to verify the authenticity of the domain, “is there really a
domain named herts.ac.uk (and is it the university or not)” or the relationship,
“is LJ really AT herts.ac.uk”. Whether such an association between users and
domains is true or not is actually controlled by the encryption-based access
control mechanism which will be introduced in section 5.4. For now, let us
focus on the mechanism for relating users to corresponding domains.
5.2 Profile Certificates
For PKI and other similar schemes involving TTPs, an advantage is that
authenticating a domain is easy (compared to authenticating a large number of
individual end users) [24]. Early Identity Certificates (i.e. X.509 [65] and PGP
[132]) operated to guarantee the authenticity of a certain user’s public key by
associating it with a user’s ID. However, global identity (i.e. globally unique
user IDs) is a strong assumption and more significantly it does not really
solve the correct problem (that we would like to be solved).Thus, SPKI/SDSI
systems [99, 43] have defined a more flexible and security sensitive form of
certificate, the Attribute Certificate. It breaks unnecessary binding between
identities and public keys. It works with an access control policy by embedding
key holders’ privileges into certificates.
For the Identity-based Cryptography (or IBC), it is easy to authenticate
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an individual user, as the users’ IDs are the significant component for their
public keys. Most IDC systems do not require any forms of certificates by
assuming that each domain’s validated public key is always available. I intend
to relax this assumption a little bit more.
I will re-define traditional certificates and introduce a new form of certifi-
cate, Profile Certificate (PC), for implementing the Encryption-based Access
Control mechanism. By way of contrast to existing certificates, the PC here
does not act in a decision making role for users. I do not mind having CAs
in a security system, but they shall be utilised correctly for the right purpose
instead of effectively acting as users’ decision makers. The sole purpose of
having PC here is to attach a user to a domain for a particular purpose (note
that users may have a presence in several different domains for different pur-
poses.). Semantically, it is analogous to an email address for a user. It is not
necessary to have CAs in each domain or hierarchical/chained infrastructure.
Instead, a certain number of (optimistically) trusted authorities called Profile
Certificate Authorities (or ProCAs), are available distributively, and no trust
transitivity subsists among them.
A ProCA’s responsibility is not to supply any crypto knowledge. They
intend to provide the information that a certificate holder is from a certain
domain. Whether such information is correct or not is subsequently controlled
by the domain itself rather than the ProCA. We know that the entire security
of the user domain can be compromised if the traditional CAs make a wrong
decision. On the other hand, if the ProCA certify the wrong relationship be-
tween users and domains, it does not matter (except for performance) because
the decision is ultimately managed by the local domain. It is an efficient ap-
proach as the ProCA do not need to understand the semantics of the requests
from users. The ProCA only provides hints of where to get started.
Public keys of those ProCAs are assumed to be always available. Again,
the IDs or names of domains or users do not have any security-related meaning
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in the system. The core elements for Profile Certificates (PC) are,
1. Owner’s public key: instead of naming an entity, the owner is identi-
fied by the public key.
2. Issuer’s public key: identifier of the issuing ProCA. The ProCA
embeds its own public key into the owner’s profile certificate. Hence,
all verifiers of a profile certificate are able to check if a correct ProCA’s
public key is used.
3. Profile: the outlined security view for the owner, associating the owner
with corresponding domain. The way of profiling domains/users will
vary with respect to the context of applications, in addition to the do-
main’s local policy. It can depend upon the role, the location, the date,
and so on. Likewise, if a local domain’s security policy is really satisfied
with having a local unique identity/name as a profile, it is not that bad
as long as the policy can be kept locally. However, I will not encourage
to do so considering the significant expense on the practical implemen-
tation. Taking revocation as an example, additional inputs are required
as we cannot revoke a person’s identity in practise.
4. Security Responsibility: implication of domain information, “who is
responsible for the holder on a certain matter”, or “where to get started”.
A profile certificate, PCS, for S is two identifier fields, profile and security
responsibility parameters, signed by the issuing ProCA’s private key. For
instance, assume that the public key for a ProCA and for a company B is
K+ProCA and K
+
B respectively. The different roles within company B are de-
ployed to profile its employees, e.g. CompanyB.Marketing.Manager, Compa-
nyB.Financial.Clerk, or CompanyB.IT.Engineer, and so on. A typical profile
certificate PCB for a company B will be,
Owner’s Public Key Issuer’s Public key Profile Security Responsibility
K
+
B K
+
ProCA Role CompanyB
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“CompanyB” is used as the security responsibility in the PCB. It is not an
identity/name but an indication, “where to get started”. It can be e.g. an
on-line website, a mobile number, an email address, or a location based upon
the context of different applications.
In terms of its function, the role used as the profile in company B’s profile
certificate differs from the one in the role-based access control systems [53,
106]. A role does not help verifiers to make an access control decision based
upon which role company B’s employees have. Instead, it intends to give the
verifiers a clue what to expect in the employees’ profile certificates. Specifically,
a verifier will not expect to see an employee’s profile certificate use “Main
Building” as his/her profile when company B profiles its employees by role
rather than geography. Thus, PCBob for the company B’s marketing manager
Bob will be
Owner’s Public Key Issuer’s Public key Profile Security Responsibility
K
+
Bob K
+
ProCA CompanyB. PCB
Marketing.
Manager
Note that the profile for a local user is specific within a domain. Also, the
domain’s profile certificate is embedded into its local users’ profile certificates.
For the profile certificate, note that there are two arguments here.
1. In the domain-oriented approach for access control over multiple do-
mains, it is important that a malicious user cannot set up a false/bad
domain at the beginning. Consequently, I argue that it is a fair as-
sumption that ProCA will be unlikely to certify an association between
a malicious user and its own established false/bad domain. This can
be realised mainly via some social responsibilities probably gained from
other channels. For instance, to set up a legitimate company, we have
to register with some business registration authorities; or a university
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has to pass the higher education commission’s assessment before it can
recruit overseas students.
2. It also appeals that profile certificate authorities do not need to main-
tain any kind of certificate revocation mechanisms due to the impact
from the domain-oriented approach for access control. The social re-
sponsibilities can also be applied here to revoke a domain’s certificate,
such as, a company has to withdraw its registration before its closure.
The basic assumption is every player (i.e. domains, ProCAs) should be
able to know if a domain is not here any more. For instance, a company
“suicides” itself by broadcasting its closing down message. It is trivial to
revoke a user’s profile certificate because the final commit/abort decision
comes from their local domains.
In conclusion, differing from the conventional semantics of certificates, the
profile certificate is used here to give all verifiers an indication, where to get
started. Purpose of the profile certificate is to improve performance, and the
certificate needs to be “mostly right”. This form of certificate is not used to
make a final commit/abort decision. Instead, the access control decision is
managed by the classical authentication and authorisation steps but with a
new notion of delegation.
5.3 Delegation and Access Control over Mul-
tiple Domains
As described above in section 5.1, the domain-oriented approach for access
control in the LoT framework is to reduce the (hard) access control across
domains problem to two (easier) problems, remote authorisation between do-
mains, and localised authentication in a single domain. As in figure 5.2 (on
page 94), I assume Alice and university B as a resource domain and a users
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domain respectively, Bob is a user from university B who intends to access the
resource S owned by Alice.
5.3.1 Remote Authorisation - Delegation of Rights
Delegation is a natural consideration for making access control decisions [1].
Arguably, in terms of semantics, the conventional public key certificates are
generally synonymous to most delegation systems. A public key certificate is
deployed to delegate the belief on the association of a public key with other nec-
essary information (e.g. access privileges). In the domain-oriented approach,
the access control rights are managed by the resource domains, for instance
Alice. Thus, when resources are shared between domains, the resource domain
intends to delegate some access rights (on a particular resource) to the possi-
ble users’ domains, very often with some necessary restrictions. Usually, Alice
generates some forms of access credentials depending upon different delegation
mechanisms that are deployed within her own domain. Then, she hands over
the access credentials to the university B. In the multiple domain context, the
requirements for defining such access credentials are:
• Domain dependent: credentials should be domain relative. It is im-
portant that different user domains should have different values of access
credentials for the same access right on the same resource. For exam-
ple, to delegate the “allow to make domestic faxes” right to university B
and university C, Alice will generate two different bit patterns for these
two universities. In this way, the compromise of one user domain does
not help an attacker to gain any information of usable forms of access
credentials for other user domains. Moreover, the delegation mechanism
deployed in the resource domain needs to ensure that the collusion of
some misbehaving user domains still cannot assist the attacker in terms
of constructing a usable access credential.
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• Presentation restriction: in most delegated access control systems,
the possession of a delegated access credential is both necessary and
sufficient to gain access, e.g. a secure capability. For the multiple domain
context, on the contrary, I reason that the (direct) presentation of the
domain-relative credentials is neither necessary nor sufficient for a user
to access a certain resource. Actually, this presentation is extremely
restricted after being issued. Alice will not be expected to grant the
access request to Bob who naively submits the university B’s access
credential. Instead, Alice will regard university B to be compromised and
revoke university B’s access right because university B must explicitly
delegate the credential to Bob.
Remote authorisation is done when access rights are delegated across domain
boundaries from Alice to university B. Interestingly and in contrast with con-
ventional approaches, university B does not delegate any conventional forms
of access credentials to its local user Bob before the access. It may seem that
re-delegation is being restricted. LoT does appreciate the importance of allow-
ing free re-delegation but understands the semantical meaning of re-delegation
from a different viewpoint. This is due to the domain-oriented nature for the
access control mechanism in LoT.
As shown in figure 5.3, Alice does not care who Bob is as long as Bob’s
domain has the correct access credential and Bob has his domain’s permission
to use them. Hence, Alice will ask Bob to authenticate himself/herself to the
correct university B.
5.3.2 Localised Authentication
Thus, the user Bob is essentially authenticated by his local domain, university
B. We notice that the place to do authentication is different. It changes from
the receipt’s domain (i.e. the resource owner, Alice) to the sender’s domain
(i.e. the user domain, university B), as indicated in figure 5.4.
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Alice 
Bob
University B’s
 server
Access Credentials
Delegating 
Access Credentials
"Can you recognise this 
access credentials?"
University B’s
 server
Access Credentials
Alice 
Bob
"Let your university help you to 
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Figure 5.3: The concept of the conventional approaches is briefly described in
the left diagram. University B delegates the access credential (in some form) to
its student Bob. Bob then submits this delegated access credential and expects
Alice to be able to recognise them. As illustrated in the right diagram in our
alternative scenario, university B does not delegate the access credentials in
any form before Bob’s request for access. Alice will ask Bob to authenticate
himself to the correct university.
The authentication step only occurs locally (within the users domain). A
local authentication channel will be established between players and their local
domains.
Local Authentication Channel: a communication channel is said to
be an authentication channel, if it can sufficiently provide both the authen-
ticity and confidentiality of any information exchanged between local users
and their associated domains. This channel can be realised by many existing
mechanisms, e.g. classic Kerberos like protocols [46, 122], policy-based trust
management [16], or more pervasive security protocols [13, 45, 121], etc.
I do not intend to discuss those mechanisms in great detail in this dis-
sertation. Instead, I encourage domains to choose a proper authentication
mechanism freely and be responsible for their choice, in accordance with their
own domain policies. The only requirement is that the authentication channel
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Figure 5.4: For Alice, it is undoubtedly frustrating and difficult to authenticate
someone from other domains. By allowing university B to authenticate Bob
locally, Alice will not have to spend resources to understand the semantics of
the authentication mechanism in a different domain, university B.
established in the local domains will not be compromised in the future. Both
users and local domains can be guaranteed that they are talking to the one
whom they think they are.
For the localised authentication step, note that university B’s server need
not necessary be on-line all the time (I will explain this a little bit more in the
next section, see page 110). From Alice’s perspective, it is Bob’s problem to
authenticate himself/herself to not only university B, but the correct university
B.
The basic idea of localised authentication has been hinted in the Identity-
based Encryption cryptosystem (IBE). The IBE system does not require a
chained or transitive trust relationship along the transmission path. Instead,
trust is only established between end-users and a local trusted party, e.g.
Private Key Generator (PKG) in the user’s local domain. But nevertheless,
to my best knowledge, this idea has not previously been explored significantly
in the way that I will describe in this dissertation.
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As a resource owner, Alice should not be forced to “contact” different
possible universities every time their students come to request access. Hence,
it is desired to have a mechanism connecting remote authorisation and localised
authentication steps in the domain-oriented approach for access control over
multiple domains. This can be realised by encryption-based access control.
5.4 Architecture for Encryption-based Access
Control
Encryption-based access control (EBAC) is a relatively new concept, but it has
been rapidly developed in pairing-based cryptosystems [18, 61, 117]. From the
perspective of encryption, the encryption-based access control sketched here is
analogous to some existing Identity-based encryption (IBE) schemes [2, 51, 63].
For instance, in figure 5.2 on page 94, it lets Alice encrypt a message in a way
that Bob can only decrypt with the necessary assistance from some security
services in his/her own domain (university B). As a consequence, it is Bob’s
responsibility to convince his (or her) local authority to issue the corresponding
decryption keys (precisely a partial decryption key). Moreover, the partial
decryption key can only be generated and supplied by correct university B.
From my perspective, pairing-based IBE is not suitable for the multiple do-
main context. In those systems, every domain’s public key has to be available,
at least at the time when a user requests the access. If the authenticity for
the domain’s public key is certified by some external certificates authorities,
the certificate revocation and trust transitivity problems re-emerge.
The basic construction for encryption-based access control proposed in this
dissertation is converted from Goldreich et al.’s self-delegation scheme [54]. In
Goldreich et al.’s original system, their purpose is to delegate certain rights
from a user to a user himself without risking the compromise of his long-term
private/public key pair (primary public/private key). Accordingly, secondary
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key pairs (skℓ, pkℓ) are created by the user. They can only be validated with
a validation tag (valℓ) based upon a certain limitation (the limitation index
ℓ). Given a triple (skℓ, valℓ, pkℓ), the player is able to convince a verifier
that a certain public key pkℓ can be used on behalf of the primary key (given
the limitation index ℓ, a primary public key and the necessary system set up
parameters). I take advantage of the fact that a private/public key pair can
also be applied to do decryption/encryption operations. Assume that PK∗ is
the full encryption key and SK∗ is the full decryption key.
If the full decryption key SK∗ can be computed by university B, restricting
misbehaving domains and users in EBAC will be hard. Two specific problems
are considered here,
1. The denial-of-service attack from university B. University B may ma-
liciously do a denial-of-service attack and claim that the access comes
from one of its students.
2. Corruption from Bob. If Bob decides to collude with another student
Moriarty from very beginning, he can just simply “hand over” SK∗ to
Moriarty after the key is issued from university B.
To address those two threats, thus, the technique used in EBAC is to separate
SK∗ into two parts, partial decryption key (PDK) and R generated by the
user’s domain and the user itself, respectively.
The overview for encryption-based access control described above is illus-
trated in figure 5.5. Those steps will be describe in detail in next chapter.
Briefly speaking, Alice delegates a domain-based access credential (ACB) to
university B (i.e. its domain server). When a student Bob from university
B requests to access a particular resource owned by Alice, she will give Bob
an access “token” based upon Bob’s access request. This “token” can only
be converted to a usable access capability if the correct university B issues a
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Figure 5.5: To access Alice’s resources, a student Bob has to retrieve the a
partial decrytion key (PDK) from university B.
PDK at the time of Bob’s access. Thus, it is Bob’s job to convince univer-
sity B that he is entitled to access this particular resource. As far as Alice is
concerned, she does not care how Bob authenticates himself to his own uni-
versity. She is happy to grant Bob’s access once the conversion is completed
successfully 3.
For PDK generated by user domains: PDK can be provided by
university B. It is based upon the access credential (ACB) delegated from
Alice to university B during the remote authorisation step. As described
above, however, the presence of ACB is extremely restricted. Therefore, the
requirements for defining PDK are to be,
• Session-dependent: for every access request from its students, the PDK
issued from university B will be different. This is mainly to avoid Bob’s
dishonest behaviour or the replay attack. In addition, similar to the case
of environmental key generation [97], university B may restrict Bob to
allow access only if certain classes of environmental conditions are true,
for instance, on a certain date, at a certain time, and so on. University B
can take those local restrictions, environmental requirements and Bob’s
personal information, and denote them by access index ǫ.
3If audit trail is one of the concerns for some applications, another “audit token” can
be provided by university B (and embedded in the access token). Alice cannot decrypt this
audit token, nor re-produce it. However, if something is going wrong, Alice can present the
audit token issued by university B simply for the purpose of the audit trail.
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• The second requirement is quite straightforward. Given any collections
of issued PDKs from a set of students in university B, an attacker cannot
compute the value of ACB.
In EBAC, SKǫ is added to generate a PDK. It is the secret part of the key
pair (SKǫ, PKǫ) generated by university B after inputting the access index ǫ.
Moreover, the use of SKǫ is to guarantee that the ACB will be kept secret to
university B (the users domains). Also, this key pair (SKǫ, PKǫ) is called the
Endorsement Pair in EBAC.
For R generated by users: the generation of R is based upon the idea
of delegation of responsibility [36] (see the brief review in section 2.3.2 on
page 40). In the domain-oriented access control approach in LoT, users are
organisationally affiliated with their local domains. EBAC lets Bob contribute
a secret component R. R is the secret part of the key pair (SKr, PKr)
generated by Bob. It plays two important roles here. First of all, the existence
of R prevents a misbehaving university B to masquerade as Bob. Secondly
and more importantly, if Bob decides to collude with another student Moriarty
from the very beginning, Bob has to give SKr to Moriarty. This will force Bob
to compromise his personal secret to an attacker, in order to breach security.
We can consider for example that this (SKr, PKr) pair is associated with
some form of digital cash [7, 23, 100, 124] for Bob. Thus, Bob is not willing to
give up SKr by any means. The key pair (SKr, PKr) is called Responsibility
Pair in EBAC.
For ACB generated by resource owners: as discussed in section 5.3.1
(see page 101), ACB is required to be domain-dependent. Thus, Alice generates
a master secret SK firstly in her own domain and computes a pair (SKℓ,PKℓ)
for university B. This pair is called the access rights pair, where PKℓ is ACB.
From the requirements of being domain-dependent, we know,
• Given any single value from PKℓ, it is (computationally) infeasible to
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compute the corresponding SKℓ.
• Given a set of values from a set of PKℓ, it is still (computationally)
infeasible to compute any SKℓ or the master secret value SK.
The construction of the access rights pair will be highly dependent on the
mechanism that Alice chooses to use to delegate access rights, e.g. a secure
capability, a public key pair, and so forth.
Encryption/Decryption: now, we will have,
• The Partial Decryption Key (PDK)
PDK = ACB ∪ SKǫ = PKℓ ∪ SKǫ, (1)
• A full encryption/decryption key pair,
Encryption key: PK∗ = SKℓ ∪ PKr ∪ PKǫ, (2)
Decryption key: SK∗ = PDK ∪ SKr = PKℓ ∪ SKǫ ∪ SKr, (3)
• Two algorithms, Encrypt{} and Decrypt{}.
1. Encrypt{}: this algorithm is used to encrypt a message M under
the encryption key, PK∗, after inputting SKℓ, PKr, PKǫ.
2. Decrypt{}: correspondingly, it is called by Bob to recover the mes-
sage M by taking the full decryption key, SK∗, after inputting
PDK and SKr.
Note that “∪’ here is only a symbol. The mathematical meaning varies depend-
ing on the underlying cryptographic algorithm chosen in the implementation.
More practical approaches will be given in next chapter.
Thus, for EBAC,
1. By having a secret input R from a user, e.g. a student Bob, two threats,
the denial-of-service attack from university B and the corruption from
Bob can be addressed as discussed above.
109
2. By having a secret input SKǫ in PDK from a user domain, e.g. univer-
sity B, university B does not have to be on-line all the time. University
B can send the PDK for Bob to a directory for example. Bob only needs
to get this PDK from the directory.
Generally speaking, revocation works closely with access control, the del-
egation semantics in particular. Revocation discussed in access control con-
text is mainly subject to the various delegation relationship among resources
servers domains, users domains and associated local users. We cannot discuss
delegation without having revocation in mind.
5.5 Revocation
From a security perspective, revocation is a way to prevent unauthorised access
resulting from the use of some invalidated statements. But meanwhile revoca-
tion is one of the main difficulties for many security systems. A notorious case
is the (public key) certificate revocation problem that has been witnessed in
many PKI-based systems. Conventionally, the revocation problem has been
dealt with separately and some ad-hoc mechanisms have been provided for
managing revocation information [59]. However, there are two problems of
doing so,
1. From the infrastructure’s perspective, users will have to understand the
semantics of revocation separately. Unfortunately, it is difficult to be-
lieve that users will understand and check the detached revocation mech-
anisms at all. For most conventional revocation schemes, it is up to one
communication participant to check if the information is revoked. For
simplicity or performance reason, users may be more likely to choose not
to use additional revocation mechanisms, particularly if this request is
forced by the infrastructure. In pervasive environments, it is infeasible
and unnecessary to require a user from one domain to understand the
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semantics of the revocation mechanisms in other domains. Moreover,
if the infrastructure pushes applications to check revocation by default,
each domain has to make sure their own security policies satisfy the in-
frastructure’s requirements and assumptions. This is not what we want,
particularly in the multiple domain context.
2. For the semantics of revocation itself, a more serious problem is the time-
liness of revocation information. In short, revocation requires users to
obtain necessarily real-time revocation information. For the conventional
approaches, both pull and push by (revocation information) providers
suffer from this problem. This timeliness concern is more significant for
pervasive environments. As pervasive communications usually involve
multiple domains, a domain may not always be aware of any security
policy changes in other domains. Again, the conventional approach to
this is to let the infrastructure play a crucial role. The infrastructure is
responsible for collecting the relevant revocation information from dif-
ferent domains. Then, the users from the other domains can check with
the infrastructure, if they need. It is doubtful to have in place such an
infrastructure always accessible by remote domains in pervasive envi-
ronments. Also, the extra cost to manage revocation will be significant
because most pervasive applications may be taking place on a purely
temporary basis.
Here are the two main issues I understand for revocation in EBAC in the
LoT framework.
• Revoking local users’ access request: this is the primary issue in this
dissertation as far as revocation is concerned. The domain-oriented ap-
proach, particularly the EBAC method, brings many advantages in terms
of addressing the revocation problem. Under some circumstances, uni-
versity B may want to revoke a student Bob’s access rights on accessing
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the shared resources owned by Alice. It may be the long-term case, e.g.,
Bob is not a Ph.D student any more. Or, it may be for a temporary
invalidation, e.g. Bob takes one day’s leave from the university. For
both cases, providing the real-time revocation information is crucial but
unfortunately most revocation mechanisms fail to do so efficiently.
In contrast, the EBAC method deployed in the domain-oriented ap-
proach manifests the efficiency of revoking the users’ access request. It
is considered to be part of normal transaction. As shown in figure 5.5
(on page 107), Bob cannot generate a full decryption key without ac-
quiring a current PDK from university B. Moreover, Bob is not able
to compute the correct PDK on his/her own. Consequently, the PDK
can be considered as the revocation factor created by university B. To
revoke Bob’s access request, the only thing university B needs to do is to
simply stop issuing the PDK, when Bob requests the necessary crypto
key materials in the real-time interactions. Once B drops its pointer to
the PDK, the access from Bob immediately stops forwarding. All the
access statements Bob has become useless.
• Revoking delegated access rights across domains: In EBAC, access rights
are managed by resource servers domains. The rights are delegated only
at the domain level, from a resource servers domain (Alice) to a users
domain (university B). Alice may not want any students from univer-
sity B to access a certain resource any more, for instance, the contract
expires. For the domain-oriented approach, she just needs to revoke
the proper access rights for university B. Since revoking access rights
takes place within her own domain, Alice can maintain a domain-based
access control list locally 4. If she wants to revoke a domain’s access
4Having a local access control list is not a step backward. Like Karger’s S-CAP [69], an
access control list is adequate here as long as it can be kept local to Alice’s own domain.
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rights, she deletes this domain’s profile certificate from the domain ac-
cess control list. To compose a user’s profile certificate, the domain’s
profile certificate has to be included. As a result, if a requester’s PC
contains a revoked domain’s information (more precisely, the domain’s
profile certificate), Alice will abort the communication.
Advantages: the domain-oriented approach for access control over mul-
tiple domains, particularly the EBAC method, has the following properties in
terms of revocation.
• Integration: instead of being treated separately, revocation is (partially)
integrated into the normal transaction. The principle is rather simple.
University B releases the PDK if its local students’ access requests are
still validated from its own perspective. Otherwise, university B stops
the issue of the PDK. This scheme essentially reduces the cost that is
used to establish additional revocation mechanisms.
• Immediateness : Alice will know Bob’s access statement has been revoked
immediately, if Bob cannot successfully decrypt the message encrypted
by Alice. Revocation occurs in real-time.
• Seletiveness : under some circumstance, university B may just want to
revoke Bob’s access temporarily, e.g. for one interaction or one day.
Using the EBAC method, university B does not need to (“physically”)
revoke anything. Instead, university B stops issuing PDK to Bob for
this instance. When Bob resumes his job next day, domain B starts to
issue the PDK again.
• Revocation Transitivity : domains’ profile certificates are cascaded into
their own users’ ones. Thus, once university B’s certain access right
has been revoked, access requests from any students from university B
will be denied automatically. Again, a player’s profile certificate does
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not have to be accurate because the finally decision will go back to the
player’s local domain.
Thus, the PDK is like a freshest certificate, however,
• A player, Bob, has to have it to access a resource.
• It is domain B’s problem if issuing a correct PDK to correct Bob goes
wrong.
5.6 Conclusions
The entire design of the Encryption-based access control scheme is motivated
by the domain-oriented viewpoint in the LoT framework. It is based upon
the concept of localising the trust. More specifically,in LoT the commit/abort
security decision is ultimately managed by the local domain, rather than ex-
ternal authorities. This is an efficient approach because a user does not need
to understand the semantics of security mechanisms in other domains. More-
over, the EBAC scheme effectively solves the inherent revocation bottleneck
in most delegation focused access control systems. The most difficult aspect
in terms of the revocation problem is addressed by treating revocation as part
of the normal transaction in the EBAC scheme.
The domain-oriented EBAC scheme is the central stone for LoT. In the
next chapter, I will investigate two access control scenarios, stranger access
and guest access. Also, I will describe the details of implementing the EBAC
scheme enabling them in pervasive environments.
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Chapter 6
Semi-Trusted Agent Mediated
Protocols for Access Control
Two different scenarios will be examined in this chapter, as highlighted in
section 3.5 (see page 67). A player who intends to access some shared resources
from other domains may be a stranger to the resource domain. Or, a player can
be from a domain who is unknown to the resource domain, however, the player
is friendly (most likely on a purely temporary basis) to some of local players
from the resource domain. Those two scenarios are referred to, strangers access
from friendly domains, and guests access respectively. My attention will be
focused upon the strangers access from friendly domains because arguably the
guests access scenario is indeed a case of access control for a single domain (I
will explain this later on in section 6.5).
This chapter begins with an overview of the Semi-Trusted Agent Mediated
Protocol for achieving access control in pervasive environments. Then, I il-
lustrate an example threat model for strangers access from friendly domains
in section 6.2. Section 6.3 describes a Dual Capabilities Model, which is used
for domain-based access control. Detailed protocol implementation for achiev-
ing localised authentication in encryption-based access control is proposed in
section 6.4. This chapter ends with a brief analysis of the guest access scenario.
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6.1 The Overview of the Semi-Trusted Agent
Mediated Protocol (STAMP)
STAMP in the LoT framework is designed to provide necessary access control
in the multiple domain context, and has been optimised to work in pervasive
environment. Essentially, it has three primary components: resources, agents
and (domain) servers. A resource is any type of resources or services within a
domain that are potentially accessible by users, or shared with other domains.
It could be either hardware, e.g. a DVD player, a fax machine, a wireless
camera, or some software programs running on some devices.
The architecture for STAMP is based upon domains. Each domain is
controlled by a domain server whose responsibility is to manage its local users
and resources. It allows users and services/resources to register, and provide
appropriate profile certificates 1 to them, for instance. In addition, two types
of agents have been employed by STAMP, capability agents and semi-trusted
agents (or STAs).
• Capability agents: the capability agent maintains a User Domain-level
Access Control List for any shared services/resources owned by the do-
main. When a user requesting the access (on a particular resource)
is from other (user) domains, the capability agent will firstly check if
the domain this requester belongs to has the appropriate access right.
Moreover, the capability agent is responsible for delegating the access
rights between domains during the remote authorisation process (that
is, cross-domain delegation phase). The details are described in section
6.3.
• STAs: STAMP introduces semi-trusted agents to extend the domain-
oriented approach for access control over multiple domains. Those agents
1As indicated in section 5.2, the profile certificates for both domains and their affiliated
users ought to be issued by a local profile certificate authority.
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are trusted only by their own associated domain servers. More specif-
ically, the communication channels between domain servers and those
agents are assumed to be secure, i.e. authenticated, non-repudiated and
confidential. However, neither local users nor domain servers from the
other domains need to trust those agents at all. For instance, a player
may not have accessed a particular local resource before and therefore
has not talked to a particular STA at all. Thus, those agents are con-
sidered to be semi-trusted. They can be in different forms with respect
to the nature of multiple-domain applications, such as hardware devices,
software running at a personal device, or a website, and so forth.
Figure 6.1 shows an overview of the STAMP architecture from one domain
viewpoint. Note that multiple semi-trusted agents may exist for one domain.
Domain
Server
Resource A
Capability
Agent
Semi-
Trusted 
Agent
Domain level
access control
local users pool
user A
user BPartial Decryption
Keys Retrieval
resources pool
Resource B
Figure 6.1: STAMP Overview
The overview of STAMP
Roughly speaking, the STAs’ major purpose is for users to retrieve partial de-
cryption keys (PDK) that are deployed in the encryption based access control
method. As a consequence, localised authentication is accomplished.
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Semantically, STAMP follows the description of the domain-based ap-
proach for access control over multiple domains. Users’ own domains are
responsible to make the final commit/abort decision for their local users via
supplying the necessary partial decryption key (PDK). The success of the user
retrieving the correct PDK will convince the remote resource owner that the
access requester has the proper authorisation to access some shared resources
across domain boundaries.
Semi-Trusted Agents: The semi-trusted agents have a vital role in the
STAMP architecture. There are three major reasons to have such agents here.
1. An advantage of the domain-oriented approach for access control is that
the domain server controls the necessary PDK for its local users. How-
ever, it also means that the domain server has to be on-line all the time
for issuing the PDK, and more important dealing with real-time revoca-
tion. By employing local agents, domain servers can be kept off-line after
sending PDKs to agents at the beginning of every period of time (let us
say every day). Domain servers only need to be on-line if they would
like to change their local users’ states (e.g. revoking or re-validating).
2. The STAs from one domain may be geographically located in different
places. However, they are based upon domains and therefore local to
their own domain servers. In other words, parts of them act like lo-
cal agents. Thus, it is fair to assume that the secure channel between
STAs and their associated domain servers is always available. Generally,
to jam this channel is both difficult and expensive in practice. More
importantly, the responsibility to keep the channel open rests entirely
within one domain.
3. Moreover, having an agent brings the potential benefit of keeping the
resource devices themselves simple. In pervasive environments, those
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resources devices can be wearable gadgets, DVD players, kitchen ap-
pliances or any lightweight devices. If the resource device has limited
computational power, they can communicate with nearby agent(s), al-
lowing agent(s) to run some complicated tasks for them 2.
6.2 Strangers Access from Friendly Domains
6.2.1 Motivating Threat Model - Public Meeting 2
I again focus upon a simple but interesting (in the security protocol sense)
pervasive application, the public meeting. It has already been described in
section 4.1.2. The company A’s marketing manager Alice meets company B’s
marketing manager Bob for the first time in a public conference room. She
would like to securely transfer a private project plan m from DRDalice to Bob’s
hand-held device DRDbob this time. I assume that the context of human trust
between Alice and Bob is missing in this scenario, for instance, Alice does
not know Bob in person. In other words, Bob is a stranger to Alice although
company B is known to Alice. Thus, Alice has to be convinced that she is
talking to the right Bob as well as talking to the right device.
Considering the basic approach in chapter 5, the computations might be the
same. The semantics, however, are totally different with respect to the change
of context in this threat model. Previously, the weak secret k is generated
randomly and agreed by Alice and Bob. Now, it has to be shared between
two friendly domains, company A and company B, for this meeting’s purpose
first. Both Alice and Bob are delegated this secret value from their own
company. It is also necessary that Alice and Bob load this pre-shared secret
into their devices respectively. They have no chance to observe each other’s
inputs during the meeting. If this secret is leaked to an insider attacker (e.g.
2A secure communication channel between a device and a agent in a either wired or
wireless network can be established by using many existing security protocols that have
been widely developed in conventional environments. The discussion on this issue is out of
the scope of this dissertation.
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a bad guy from company B) somehow, he (or she) can masquerade as Bob
without Alice’s awareness. Hence, the security is being provided in the wrong
place from the very beginning, as Alice talks to the wrong Bob.
It does not get better if security protocols require Bob to show some proof
(conventionally somehow relating to IDs again), e.g. traditional personal ID
card issued by company B, or a signed letter from the company B 3. Alice may
not be able to recognise those proofs issued by the company B because she is
from a different company A. Even if she may, it is still difficult and frustrating
for her to be aware of any policy changes which have occurred in the company
B.
Thus, the main threat I try to address in this example is the confinement
problem associated with the stranger access from a friendly domain, in contrast
to the man-in-the-middle attack in the public meeting 1 scenario.
6.2.2 Confining an Insider
I (deliberately) associate the stranger access scenario with the classic confine-
ment issue here. The confinement problem is defined by Lampson [76] in the
early 70s. It is to determine whether a series of operations will pass informa-
tion to an unauthorised process or not. Access control policy is an important
security policy to address the confinement problem. It is fairly straightforward
to prevent an outsider from gaining access to unauthorised resources for most
access control systems. However, the problem is the unsuspecting insiders.
Particularly, in the case of stranger access (from friendly domains), Alice may
not be aware of the semantic difference between a stranger authorised by the
stranger’s own domain and an inside attacker who is from the same domain
as the stranger.
Loosely speaking, in this dissertation,
3We can think of this signed letter as the form of traditional public key certificates in
the cyber-world.
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Confinement : to confine potential damage from an insider within the local
domain. We can take the public meeting as an example, Alice should be
informed to abort at time of interaction, if a usable access credential has been
leaked to another unauthorised user in company B.
Moreover, confinement is a mechanism to restrict an insider’s wrongdoing.
We do not expect to see that an insider Moriarty could masquerade as Bob
by, for instance, stealing the secret credential on Bob’s personal device. On
the other hand, if Bob is misbehaving, he should be the one who suffers the
most.
STAMP can be deployed here to confine an insider. The delegation of
rights is achieved by the remote authorisation step through capability agents,
as discussed in the previous section. Consider spontaneous and dynamic per-
vasive interactions, we need a flexible mechanism to delegate access rights
between domains in STAMP. This naturally leads us to a capability-based
access control method.
6.3 Dual Capabilities Model (DuCaM)
Dual capabilities deployed in DuCaM are similar to the idea in I-CAP [55] and
split capability proposed in [72]. The dual capabilities heavily borrow Gong’s
novel idea of having internal and external capabilities. However, the basic
system infrastructure for DuCaM is built from the domain-oriented approach
for access control (over multiple domains), which is completely different to
I-CAP. As pointed out in section 2.2.3 (see page 35), an additional authen-
tication mechanism is required in the I-CAP system to check the user’s ID
at time of using the external capability. In DuCaM, restricting the presen-
tation of (external) capabilities is utilised to secure the capabilities instead
of requiring a reliable authentication mechanism across domains. In DuCam,
121
authentication occurs only locally within the user domain. From this signif-
icant semantic difference, capabilities used in DuCaM are not simply access
control oriented tokens only. In fact, their primary task is to let (remote) users
authenticate themselves to their own domains, and more importantly to the
correct domains.
Going back to the public meeting case (on page 119), assume Alice (the
resource owner), company B (a user domain) and Bob (a stranger from a user
domain) have their issued profile certificate, PCA, PCB and PCbob respectively.
Note that some notions used below have been explained in section 5.4.
I only consider one direction of trust, in which Alice would like to make
sure Bob is the right stranger from company B, purely for simplicity. If mutual
trust is required (e.g. the meeting for two secret societies), the same protocol
will be used but changing the direction.
Dual capabilities: the capability agent managed by Alice generates dual
capabilities for some possible organisations, for instance company B, on a
shared resource, the project document obm in the public meeting case.
• Internal Capability : this keeps the same form as the one in I-CAP. The
capability agent generates a random secret r, for some resources owned
by Alice, e.g. the document obm.
IntCap= (obm, r),
where, r is only known to Alice’s capability agent as a master secret.
• External Capability : company B initiates a service request by sending
the profile certificate (PCB) to Alice. Alice checks her own local access
control policy, and inform her capability agent to delegate appropriate
access right to company B. The capability agent updates the domain-
level access control list (on obm) by inserting an new entry of PCB, then
produces an external capability for company B,
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(ExtCapB),
where,
ExtCapB = h{obm, r, AccessRights, PCB}
h{} is an one-way hash function. Eventually, the external capability will
be handed over to university B via Alice.
The basic diagram is illustrated in the figure 6.2,
Alice 
Company B’s
Server
External Capability
Internal Capability
Profile Certificate
Capability 
Agent
External 
Capability
Figure 6.2: The resource owner Alice’s capability agent generates a domain-
dependent credential, external capability, for a user domain company B.
We can think of the internal capability as a master secret SK, and the
access rights pair (SKℓ, PKℓ) introduced in previous chapter are,
SKℓ=obm, r, AccessRights, PCB,
PKℓ=ExtCapB=h{SKℓ},
The possession of an external capability in STAMP is not sufficient to gain
access to a certain object. The main purpose of having a domain-specific
external capability is not for the (conventional) access control purpose only.
Essentially, it is used for the localised authentication step. Within company
B, the external capability will not be delegated to any employees in any form
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before the access. Instead, it will be stored in a safer place (than carrying
around), e.g. the company B’s server, or some other places that company B’s
server has a stable connection with.
Access process: when Bob requests access on objm, Alice will respond
to Bob with a form of “token” (using the encryption-based access control
method). Essentially, whether Bob can use the information encrypted in this
way by Alice is not Alice’s concern at all. It is Bob’s job to convert the “token”
to a usable material. Moreover, Alice knows the right company B has to get
involved to accomplish this conversion successfully. Hence, if this can be done
by Bob, it is good enough to convince Alice that the person she intends to
talk to is from the correct company B for the current meeting’s purpose. In
other words, from Alice’s perspective, authentication takes care itself.
6.4 Discrete-Logarithm based Scheme for Lo-
calised Authentication
In this section, I will describe a practical implementation to achieve localised
authentication in the context of EBAC. The underlying cryptographic scheme
of this example approach is based on discrete logarithms. More precisely, I
assume a generator g, large prime modulus q = 2p+1 for prime p, and one-way
hashing function h are publicly known. Also, random numbers generated from
the underlying algorithm must be strong (i.e. long enough to be invulnerable
to exhaustive search) as well as hard to predict.
For a chosen decryption/private key SK, the corresponding encryption key
(public key) is PK = gsk mod q. A typical DL-based Encryption/Decryption
example is ElGamal scheme [42]. Roughly speaking, for example, if C wishes
to encrypt a message m for D with D’s public key, gd (where d is the corre-
sponding private key for D), C should do the following,
• Select a random integer k, where 1 ≤ k ≤ q − 2.
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• Compute C1 = g
k mod q and C2 = m× (g
d)k mod q.
C sends C1, C2 to D. D can recover the m from C1, C2 using the private key d
by calculating C1
−d × C2. The Encrypt{} and Decrypt{} in this section will
use these steps.
Some procedures described later stem from the approach in section 4.4.2
(see page 86). They are mainly used to establish a two-channel protocol for
authenticating the right device. Briefly, the two channels introduced previ-
ously, one the RF channel and the other an out-of-band channel (OoB), will
be deployed here as well. I assume that DRDalice is a device for Alice, B is
a server for company B and DRDbob is a personal device for Bob. STAB is
the semi-trusted agent for company B, for instance, a website accessible from
DRDbob. Again, the channel between company B’s server (B) and this website
(STAB) is secure, and it is difficult and expensive to jam such a secure channel
in practice.
The Profile Certificates for company B and Bob are PCB and PCBob re-
spectively, where,
PCB is (K
+
B , K
+
ProCA, Role, CompanyB) signed by ProCA,
and,
PCBob is (K
+
Bob, K
+
ProCA, CompanyB.Marketing.Manager, PCB) signed by
ProCA.
The basic protocol is highlighted in figure 6.3, which follows the overall
infrastructure of encryption-based access control introduced previously (see
figure 5.5 on page 107).
Responsibility and Endorsement Pair: company B delegates the task,
“access a shared project document owned by Alice”, to its employee Bob.
STAMP recalls the encryption-based access control method here and requires
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Figure 6.3: Localised Authentication in STAMP
the generation of the responsibility pair and the endorsement pair for a user
domain, i.e. company B.
Bob (DRDbob) generates a responsibility pair, (SKr, PKr) from the under-
lying discrete algorithm, where,
PKr = g
SKr mod q,
In the meanwhile, a local authenticated channel (LAC) is established as well
between the company’s server B and DRDbob. The purpose of LAC is for
localised authentication. DRDbob submits PKr to B,
DRDbob →LAC B: PKr,
Company B inputs a certain local restriction index (ǫ) along with PKr to
compute a endorsement pair (SKǫ, PKǫ). That is,
PKǫ = g
SKǫ mod q.
Then, the delegation of task, accessing Obm, is issued from company B to Bob,
B →LAC DRDbob: PKǫ, Obm, AccessRequest, PKr,
Access Request: Bob meets Alice in a public conference room. DRDbob
generates a random number b and a weak nonce nb, then requests the access
on the project plan (Obm),
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DRDbob →RF DRDalice: PKr, PKǫ, Obm, AccessRequest, PCBob,
(gb + nb mod q),
At the same time, DRDbob sends the nb to A via the infrared link,
DRDbob →OoB DRDalice: nb,
Encryption Phase:
Alice obtains the domain information PCB from PCBob and sends it to
her capability agent. The capability agent will have to look up the (local)
domain-level access control list to make sure company B’s access rights on Obm
are still validated and appropriate. If so, the capability agent re-constructs
a permissible 4 external capability from the internal capability (Obm, r) and
access request committed by DRDBob,
ExtCapB
ℓ = h{Objm, r, AccessRequest, PCB},
Alice (DRDalice) receives ExtCapB
ℓ from the capability agent. Then, she
also generates a random number a and picks a weak secret na. Alice runs the
Encrypt{} algorithm by inputting the value of ga + na mod q,
Encrypt{}: C = EPK∗ [g
a + na mod q],
where the encryption key (recall the fomula (2) on page 109) ,
PK∗ = SKℓ ∪ PKr ∪ PKǫ = (PKǫ)
h{SKℓ} · PKr =
(gSKǫ)ExtCapB
ℓ
· gSKr mod q,
Alice sends this encrypted information to Bob.
DRDalice →RF DRDBob: C,
Also, DRDalice sends na via the second channel,
DRDalice →OoB DRDbob: na,
4Bob may request some access rights to which he is not entitled.
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If Bob is who he claims to be, he/she is now able to decrypt this message.
Furthermore, Alice computes,
g2ab mod q = (s|n1|n2)
where s is the (potential) session key, and n1 and n2 are nonces.
Partial Decryption Key Generation Phase: After authorising Bob to
access the document obm, company B’s server B computes appropriate PDKB
(recall fomula (1) on page 109),
PDKB = PKℓ ∪ SKǫ = ExtCapB · SKǫ(mod(q − 1)),
Then, B updates the STAB with this appropriate PDKB for the user Bob.
Bob retrieves PDKB from STAB via the established local authentication
channel. Assume that the link to the website (STAB) is also embedded in
the crypto-module of DRDBob. Thus, the input (the link to the STAB) and
the output (the PDKB) may be observed by the attacker if a spyware is
successfully installed in DRDB. However, the attacker cannot change the
values.
STAB →LAC DRDbob: PDKB,
Decryption Phase:
DRDbob runs the Decrypt{} algorithm by taking the PDKB and the secret
SKr. The full decryption key is (recall fomula (3) on page 109),
SK∗ = PDKB + SKr = ExtCapB · SKǫ + SKr(mod(q − 1)),
if Bob is the right stranger from a friendly company B, we should have
ExtCapB
ℓ = ExtCapB,
Thus, DRDbob would be able to get the correct decryption key (SK
∗) and
further to decrypt C. DRDbob computes g
2ab mod q = (s|n1|n2) as well.
Verification Phase:
Both DRDalice and DRDbob do the following step,
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• DRDalice →RF DRDbob: n1,
• DRDbob →RF DRDalice: n2,
If the crypto-module from DRDA finds they match, then Alice considers the
current access requester is from the correct company B for this current meeting
purpose.
Thus, Bob is authenticated by his local domain, company B. If an inside
attacker Moriarty comes to meet Alice, he has to compromise the localised
authentication mechanism in company B. Otherwise, he cannot retrieve the
correct PDK from STAB. From this, we can see that STAMP provides an
efficient solution to enforce the confinement for access control over multiple
domains.
6.5 The Guest Access Scenario
The second scenario considered here is friendly access from strange domains.
Among numerous pervasive applications, increasingly, human users intend to
access some resources that are provided by other domains, e.g. organisations,
schools or other human users, on a purely temporary basis. For instance, an
external consultant tries to access a client’s Smart Spaces [68, 21] services, a
guest wants to use the host’s TV or refrigerator, or a visiting researcher would
like to connect to the university B’s secure wireless network for a short period
of time during his visit, and so forth. Those examples indicate the necessity
of requiring guest access in pervasive environments.
The guest access scenario can easily be mis-regarded as a case of access
control over multiple domains, as the guests are from other foreign domains.
However, it is really a single domain case from the domain definition in LoT.
The intention of discussing this single domain example here is to enhance the
correct understanding of domain employed throughout this research. It does
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not, however, exploit the possible protocols to address the security issues in
the guest access scenario in detail.
I will explain this argument in detail in the rest of this section. First of
all, let us understand the characteristics of guest access.
6.5.1 The Definition of Guests
The scenario of guest access is different from the problem of talking to strangers
(which has been discussed early in this chapter), as explained in [66]. An essen-
tial characteristic of guest access is that guests can only access resources with
the necessary permission from authorised users, e.g. a family member from
the host, the local office employee. A guest has to get the host’s permission, in
order to play a video clip stored in his/her DRD on the host’s TV. However,
the guest may not be permitted to access the host PC at all depending upon
the host’s preference. Thus, three facts about guests are described as follows,
• Guests are not strangers. Guests are usually invited by hosts and they
are not strangers. An interesting observation is that guests may have
different access policies or restrictions in their own local domains, e.g.
not allowed to play a video clip on the TV in her/his own home, or a
university does not want its researchers to connect to the other universi-
ties’ wireless network. However, as guests, they are permitted to access
those resources from other users who have such authorisation. Note that
this is particularly significant. I will explain more about this later on.
• Guests are not local users. They do not have access to everything in
foreign domains. An external consultant is not an employee from the
client’s organisation. Hence, the requests for accessing Smart Space
services would be refused because the consultant’s role in this client’s
organisation is not recognisable. We may give guests the right to access
a DVD player in the living room but not for the PC in the studying area.
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• Guests are not pre-authorised users. The requirements from guests are
highly flexible. Consequently, it is infeasible to pre-define a general or
individual guest user account, a role or a capability for them beforehand.
In addition, the guests’ permission may be changed dramatically under
the hosts’ willingness. We may allow adult guests to access DVD player
but not for some under-14 years old guests. Even for the same guest,
the host may change his/her permission on the access of some resources
depending upon the nature of different contexts.
Thus, the scenario of guest access is defined as follows,
Guest Access: the access on some resources is said to be guest access
only if the request is under the permission from authorised users, i.e. resource
owners or other users who have corresponding access rights. Compared with
guests, I will use a more general term, authorised users in the rest of this
chapter. They are the users who have been authorised to access some resources
either in their own domains or in other foreign domains.
6.5.2 Common Approaches for Guests Access
An essential concern for guest access is about how to give the appropriate per-
missions to guests. For authorised users, the “easiest” (unfortunately also the
naive) way is to hand over to the guests their own capabilities. Semantically,
it is similar to giving guests the door key for the house. It has major difficulty
to revoke. It is important that the system can prevent guests from making
their own copy of capabilities. Otherwise, the expensive process of changing
the door lock has to be fulfilled every time after each guest’s access. Also, it is
cumbersome if the host wants to revoke the guest’s access right immediately
after the hand-over process completes.
Allowing the central system to set up a temporary credential in some form
is another commonly used approach for guest access, e.g. a system account
with a user name/password associating with the appropriate access rights. The
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temporary credential will be de-activated as a result of the guest completing
the necessary access. However, this approach does not address the essential
problem for guest access in pervasive environments. In pervasive environments,
guests are most likely from stranger domains (or foreign domains), and they
may need different access rights to access some resources. This fact makes it
more difficult for authorised users to assign different guests with appropriate
access rights. This may end up with the problem that a guest may obtain a
totally inappropriate right.
6.5.3 Motivating Threat Model - Guest Printing
Consider the following example. Darren is a professor from the University of
Dolls. He is invited by Ellis, a senior lecturer in Computer Science School at
East University, to give a seminar. Darren realises that he needs to print the
presentation slides from his “DRDD” when he notices a printer on the way to
the seminar theatre.
The printer, P , cannot understand Darren’s role in computer science, and
therefore it denies his access. I assume that the printer P accepts the printing
job from Ellis’s “DRDE”
5 according to the security policy in the school
(e.g. ‘any senior staff can access printers in the school’). Thus, the basic
requirements of the security in this example are,
• The server in the Computer Science school (the owner of the printer P )
will allow the guest, Darren, to access P , under the temporary permission
from the authorised user, Ellis.
• For Darren, the right of printing is from Ellis and for the period that
Ellis specifies.
• For the server in the Computer Science school, Darren’s access is granted
if,
5The DRDE may be a stranger, or may not, from the printer viewpoint.
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– Ellis has the appropriate access right to print;
– Ellis has the right to delegate her right (i.e. printing);
– Ellis’s printing right is not revoked.
6.5.4 Introducing Guests
Instinctively, the guest printing is another example of access control over multi-
ple domains. Hence, as learned from the domain-oriented approach, it naively
appears Darren’s local domain, the university of Dolls, ought to be involved to
make the final decision. However, guests are not strangers. Instead, they are
very often invited by some authorised users. In other words, guests are usually
friendly players although they come from strange domains. The major task
here is to make sure that Darren has the appropriate rights to do the printing
job only.
Considering the specific requirements for granting the guest printing access
listed above, the guest’s (i.e. Darren) own local domain university Dolls is ac-
tually not responsible for his/her access. Ellis is responsible to introduce the
guest to the resources, i.e. the printer P . Hence, Ellis makes the final decision
in the guest printing example. In fact, it does not matter that Psychology
school at the University of Dolls is saying “no” to the server of the computer
science school at East University, perhaps because Darren just retired. The
printer does not care as long as Ellis is happy to give Darren the permission
to access the printer temporarily at this moment. Hence, knowing Darren’s
domain information does not help the printer to grant the guest access request.
In other words, the printer does not concern itself with the domain Darren is
from at all, “I do not care where the guest is from as long as he/she is intro-
duced by Ellis.”. Since the printer is managed by the server of the computer
science school as well, thus, essentially, this guest printing scenario is more a
case of access control for a single domain 6. Thus, I argue that conventional
6The case where Ellis is a stranger from a friendly domain ca also be dealt with, by
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access control methods can be used to address most guest access scenarios in
pervasive environments. These methods have been described in section 2.2,
and I do not intend to discuss the implementation in great detail here because
this research mainly focuses upon the multiple domain context.
As a visiting professor, the guest Darren is explicitly trusted by Ellis. Con-
sequently, Ellis is willing to let Darren access the printer P on a temporary
basis as long as she knows what he is doing. This may be controversial in
conventional environments. As described in Chapter 4, however, a pervasive
environment is human-centred and more importantly the human context is the
most significant consideration for pervasive environments. As human users,
we have clear intention about what we are trying to accomplish or to avoid.
A pervasive system should track human intent and the correct choice ought
to depend upon this human context [108].
According to the school’s security policy, Ellis can delegate access rights
(“permission to print on the printer P”) to anyone she trusts. Thus, she
delegates to the guest Darren the right to use the printer P . Ellis’s personal
device DRDE can send a signed delegation (e.g. the delegation certificates
[10]) to Darren’s PDA DRDD. The two channel authentication mechanism
can be implemented here to guarantee the signed delegation goes to Darren’s
device rather than that of anyone else in the proximity. Then, DRDD sends
his access request and the delegation to the printer P . The service owner,
e.g. the server of the Computer Science school, will check the school’s security
policy, i.e. if Ellis’s access right on P is still validated, and if Ellis is allowed
to delegate this rights to the guests. If the delegation conforms to the policies,
the server will send the “request to verify” (RTV) message to Ellis’s DRDE
instead of granting Darren’s access immediately,
“Are you aware that you are delegating permission to print on the printer P
to a guest who is next to the printer P?”
combining the protocols in section 6.4 and section 6.5.
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Note that the notification should include the name given to the guest by Ellis
at the time of delegation.
The printer P allows Darren to print only after Ellis responds with the pos-
itive reply. Darren’s access is on a temporary basis because this re-delegation
is managed by Ellis. Hence, Ellis can revoke this re-delegation anytime by
replying a negative message to the RTV message. Meanwhile, Darren cannot
access services other than the printer P . When he needs to access other ser-
vices, e.g. the digital projector at the seminar room, Darren must ask Ellis
for another delegation. This scenario allows Darren, a guest, to access cer-
tain services in other domains without creating a pre-defined account, role, or
identity for him.
6.6 Conclusions
This chapter provides a critical discussion for access control in LoT. It reflects
the domain-based access control method proposed previously, and examines
some issues relating to access control in pervasive environment in depth (both
from multiple domain oriented and single domain oriented perspective). The
crucial point is that this chapter gives the details of mechanisms to meet some
of the requirements identified in earlier chapters.
The next chapter concludes this dissertation by providing a summary of
contributions and some directions for future research.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
Future pervasive computing applications will be of vast scale, and often in-
tended to deal with complexly collaborative interactions from many human
users or different organisations. A powerful design technique is to examine
them from the domain perspective. Thus, trust can be reduced to a local level.
This dissertation reviewed some previous work in a number of related areas,
and examined and identified research issues that were yet to be addressed.
A novel security framework for pervasive environments, LoT, has been devel-
oped. This chapter concludes this dissertation. It begins with the highlights
of the main contributions of this work. Then, some future research directions
are suggested. Finally, it provides a closing remark of this dissertation.
7.1 Summary of Contributions
The main contribution of this thesis is the proposal of a localisable, fully
decentralised security framework – LoT. It is better suited to an open and
heterogeneous environment, such as a multiple-domain-oriented pervasive en-
vironment, than a centralised computing environment. As a recapitulation of
section 1.5, the following contributions have been made,
• Proposing the localising the trust security paradigm, serving as a simple
guideline to design future security systems for multiple domains.
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• Proposing the LoT framework as a generic model, thus providing a basic
platform on which a tool-kit like set of security mechanisms from both
authentication and access control ends can be built.
• Developing a 2-channel authentication protocol for pervasive environ-
ments instead of conventional (strong) ID-based authentication.
• Designing profile certificate as a important tool, realising the domain/local
user related information conveyance.
• Designing an architecture for a domain-oriented Encryption-based Ac-
cess Control approach, which enables flexible delegation and effective
revocation in the multiple domain context.
• Designing an extended capability-based access control model, DuCaM,
supporting the Encryption-based Access Control method.
7.2 Directions for Future Work
This thesis has developed a useful and “simple” framework for enabling sponta-
neous interactions, cross-domain authorisation and localised decision-making
in the multiple domain context, i.e. pervasive environments. However, mul-
tiple domain for pervasive computing is a relatively new concept, and thus,
this LoT framework presents an excellent basis for further exploration in this
area, particularly for providing security services in many pervasive computing
applications.
The detailed approaches and protocols demonstrated in this dissertation
are techniques which can be generalised. LoT only gives the example of two
layers, i.e. domains (domain server) and local users. This technique can be
generalised recursively, or in a more hierarchical way, with respect to differ-
ent applications. Moreover, it can also be more flexible by allowing different
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domains having different layers. This will be decided by specific security re-
quirements for particular applications. A player Alice may be required to get
the access permission not only from her own department, but also from the
financial department for example. Thus, the LoT framework will be adjusted
to require two pieces of partial decryption key. One of them is supplied by
Alice’s department server, and the other need to be provided by the server for
the financial department.
Some selected future work is suggested in this section. As pointed out in
the beginning of chapter 2 (see page 24), we cannot just simply copy the LoT
framework to address problems in different contexts. As a result, we discuss
not only a number of potential extensions built from the platform of LoT,
but most importantly some areas that would potentially benefit (to solve the
problems that they target) from generalising the techniques that have been
deployed in the development of this research. In addition, we shall be pointing
out some work that we would not want to be seen done.
7.2.1 Authentication and Expiration
The need of terminating authentication has been raised by Schneier in [110]
(see a brief discussion in section 2.1.2, page 27). On-line shopping is a typical
example. On one hand, users worry about the leakage of their personal details
(i.e. address, credit card details) which are stored in a database somewhere.
On the other hand, users will have to make relevant change in every single
website that they have an account with, when their details change (e.g. moving
house, expired credit card).
One way addressing this problem is to allow users to manage their own
information, following the “localising the trust” security paradigm. Briefly
speaking, a trusted user domain server is introduced to the loop. Based upon
users’ self-defined policy, it can be a desktop PC, home server (used to control
all the pervasive devices at home), or a trusted website. A user Alice put
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her (encrypted) details in this domain server. When she intends to purchase
some books on-line using her PDA or public computer in a local cafe, she
only sends a request to amazon.com. This request should contain information
which is enough for the server from amazon.com to know where (i.e. which
user domain server) to contact. Essentially, Alice is authenticated by her own
domain. The transaction is completed when amazon.com receives a positive
reply from Alice’s domain server 1.
Thus, Alice only needs to change details, such as the expiry date of her
new credit card, stored in her own domain server. More importantly, if she
has a transaction with a malicious website, this website will not retrieve her
secret personal details in any way.
7.2.2 Capability-based Access Control
Capability-based access control has been one of our major interests throughout
this research. Surprisingly, the research on capability-based access control has
earned little attention after the many capability-based access control systems
developed before the middle 90s. Arguably, it is probably because capability-
based access control has been fully-investigated and well-developed for a single
domain. Now, the challenging multiple domain applications have opened a new
opportunity for many early capability-based systems, for instance, Tanenbaum
and Mullender’s Amoeba [89]. For the original F-boxes in Amoeba, they
shared the same information. Hence, once an attacker breaks into one F-
box, the security for the entire Amoeba is broken. Amoeba is not alone on
this matter, unfortunately, this is a typical security problem for other early
capability-based systems (even for Gong’s multi-domain I-CAP [57]).
In this dissertation (see section 5 and 6), we showed the techniques to
adapt I-CAP [57] using the domain-oriented encryption-based access control
1For the purpose of simplicity, the bank’s server is not considered here. In practice,
however, the involvement of a bank’s server will not necessarily complicate the protocol
run.
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method. We also use the domain-level ACL and localised authentication,
which shares with S-CAP [69] a common understanding that being in an access
control list is necessary but not sufficient to gain access, and users have to
authenticate themselves again. Those techniques used in the LoT framework
can also be applied to Amoeba. We may think of placing those (tamper
resistant and trusted) F-boxes in each domain. Capabilities that are output
from an F-box should provide sufficient (but just enough) domain information
(i.e. which domain or F-box the capability holder is from) to another F-box.
User authentication, again, ought to be localised within a domain. A potential
benefit of doing so is the damage control. If one domain is broken, for example
because its F-boxes are compromised, it is not the end of the world.
When a player intends to access some resources in a remote domain, he
submits his capability to the remote domain’s domain server. The remote
domain server generates a token by inputting the player’s capability to the
remote domain’s F-box. Then, the remote F-box gives the player this token.
If the player is from the correct domain, the player should be able to convert
this token to the useful access information by satisfying his local domain’s
authentication mechanism. Specifically, a piece of information needs to be
retrieved from the player’s local domain server. Moreover, if a domain would
like to revoke its local players’ capabilities, the only thing the domain server
needs to do is to stop issuing this piece of information to its local players at
the time when transactions occur. Consequently, breaking into one F-box in
one domain does not help an attacker to subsequently break the entire system.
Each capability is constrained within one domain, and ease of revocation is
achieved by implementing domain-based encryption techniques.
Similarly, those techniques can also be deployed in classical Kerberos [86]
system. Differing from conventional Kerberos tickets, a new type of ticket is
defined to indicate which Kerberos server the ticket holder (let us say Alice)
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is from. Resource servers will hand over Alice a token based on domain infor-
mation in Alice’s ticket. If Alice is from correct domain and delegated with
correct access right, the token can be converted to a useful access capability
with her domain Kerberos server’s assistance. Thus, Alice is thought to be a
correct stranger if the conversion is completed.
7.2.3 Context-Awareness Applications in Pervasive Com-
puting
Some existing security systems have made use of the context-awareness side
of pervasive computing. Kagal’s trust-based system [67] is one of them, which
addresses security issues for pervasive computing by adding location-aware
technology. But it does not solve the inherent certificate revocation problem.
LoT could be used to address this problem by separating (conventional) certifi-
cates from final access decision-making. Ultimately, the access decision would
be made by local domains, following the localising trust design principle.
Moreover, it is noted that context is not just limited to physical location.
In fact, the context-awareness service is the awareness of the physical envi-
ronment, such as, location, audio, images or any other physical conditions in
surrounding environments. The authentication protocols described in chap-
ter 4 represent an attempt at applying different contexts (rather than just
location) to deal with situations where stranger devices are involved. This
attempt may be worthwhile to be extended to other security systems which
use context-awareness as a key security parameter.
LoT does not currently address the privacy issue. However, privacy is
an important factor for many context-awareness applications. This may be
an area that can be explored further. Again, localising trust can play an
important role in the privacy-oriented pervasive applications. A player’s per-
sonal information is only visible and available to his own domain. Foreign
domains/players do not need to know this information, because the final
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decision-making is controlled by the player’s local domain. They even do
not care about those personal information, “who you are”, “where you are”,
as long as domains are happy with their local players’ request.
7.2.4 Work that We Do Not Want To See
LoT introduces different tools to provide different security services, particu-
larly for authentication and authorisation, unlike the swiss army knife. The
methods and approaches in this tool-kit should not be treated separately. How-
ever, I do not want to see the integration of those tools into a single tool. As
witnessed from many existing security systems, a security protocol designed
for providing one security service may be less than helpful when deployed for
a totally different security purpose.
Thus, having a tool-kit in a security framework will avoid such a misuse
by enforcing security countermeasures to answer correct questions. More im-
portantly, this approach will include human users into the loop, particularly
in pervasive environments as described in chapter 4. The positive human con-
text (“we know what we are doing”) will significantly leverage the security in
pervasive environments
7.3 Conclusions
This dissertation has presented LoT, a fully localised security framework de-
signed for fast growing pervasive environment applications. It is independent
of any global trust infrastructure. Arguably, some (heavy)setup work is in-
volved at the beginning, (this is the cost of doing business) i.e. delegation
between domain servers and local users. However, once this is configured,
LoT is extremely efficient and effective to address some security issues in per-
vasive environments.
The crucial novelty of LoT lies in its architectural innovation. It
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changes the way of thinking about security by introducing multiple domains
as a primary concern, but leaving the basic underlying security protocols (for a
single domain) and system implementation untouched. Although much future
research remains to be done, as studied and demonstrated in this dissertation,
the techniques developed by LoT is a fruitful way forward in future research
for security in pervasive environments.
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